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ABSTRACT 
This study analyzes how an expanded Russian anti access and area denial strategy in 
specific cases has an impact on the global reach of the U.S. Navy. How does this 
defensive/offensive posture of strategic interdiction arise in the frame of Russian policy 
and strategy? How does this policy/strategy/order of battle unfold in the tactical and 
operational levels as a problem of maritime strategy? How does this process have an 
impact on conflict in the so-called grey zone and in actual shooting conflict? This inquiry 
especially treats how this great power threat challenges the capacity of the U.S. Navy and 
its allies and partners to operate freely on the world’s seas in areas of vital strategic 
importance. Over the last 15 years, the Russian Federation has revamped its maritime 
strategy, naval forces, and weapons in a startling manner to attempt to restrict the 
freedom of movement of maritime and aerospace forces needed to deter or constrain 
Russian aggression. Moscow has eschewed the approach of the 1970s in which it sought 
to build a blue water fleet on the classical pattern. Instead, the reformed Russian forces 
have opted to do more with less, emphasizing new shore-based, long-range weapons as 
well as submarines and surface vessels operating in a doctrinal scheme that features 
coercive diplomacy, low-intensity conflict, and a singular aggressiveness to exploit 
strategic opportunities as these arise. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the threat Russia poses to the U.S. Navy as an instrument of 
U.S. policy and strategy. Typically, this threat is articulated in such science-fiction terms 
as killer robots, secret agents, dark invaders, and the internet going blank one cold dawn, 
to say nothing of fires, floods, and pestilence.1 However, this study finds that Russia 
today poses a tangible, almost old-fashioned threat from yesteryear in which ships at sea 
and the maritime battlefield in general serve as the front lines of the grey zone for 
Russia’s attempts to dominate global politics and economics. Specifically, this paper 
considers key features of policy, strategy, operations, and tactics of Russian maritime 
policy and strategy that have been assembled under the term of area denial and anti 
access in recent years.2 
Various recent studies address land warfare in the Baltic and the specter of a 
Russian blitzkrieg on the strategic and operational levels3 featuring “fires”4 by missiles, 
                                               
1 Peter Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century (New York: 
Basic Book, 2009). On the genre of war in the future and its continuities relevant in the year 2019, see: 
Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History (New York: Public Affairs, 2017).  
2 Among the leading articles on this subject in the new century, see Andrew Krepenvich, Barry Watts, 
and Robert Work, Meeting the Anti Access Area Denial Challenge (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 
and Budgetary Assessments, 2003), https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2003.05.20-Anti-Access-
Area-Denial-A2-AD.pdf. A reading of this seminal paper in 2019 suggests that many of its key 
assumptions have been rendered problematic by the last two decades of policy, war and strategy. That is, 
for instance, the trend of the Rumsfeld era to abandon forward posts and to retreat to bases in the 
continental U.S. because of the vulnerability of large fixed bases is being undone by the desire of allies and 
partners for a forward U.S. military presence.  
3 David Shaplak and Michael Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: War-
gaming the Defense of the Baltics, RR-1253A (Santa Monica: RAND, 2016), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1253.html. Also, for the critique of same see Michael 
Kofman, “Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East,” War on the Rocks, May 12, 2016, 
https://warontherocks.com/2016/05/fixing-nato-deterrence-in-the-east-or-how-i-learned-to-stop-worrying-
and-love-natos-crushing-defeat-by-russia/.  
4 See, for instance, Defense Science Board, Study on Countering Anti Access Systems with Longer 
Range and Standoff Capabilities (Washington DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
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rockets, artillery, and projectiles of various kinds. This study focuses its attention on the 
strategic level of war in its qualitative and imponderable aspects.5 The U.S. Navy has 
assured America’s geopolitical supremacy since the end of the second World War. Now, 
after nearly two decades of inconclusive irregular wars, the Navy is poised to return to 
more central roles and missions in U.S. grand strategy in accordance with current 
maritime strategy.  
Even as the United States has fought protracted campaigns of counterterror and 
irregular warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan, China and Russia have built up their strength 
with a determination and purpose. These two aspiring world powers have tailored their 
military and maritime forces to challenge America’s ascendant global position. 
Additionally, the challenge from these two states is taking the form of an array of policies 
and new military/naval capabilities that threaten the U.S. Navy’s maritime dominance. 
The rise of these two competitors requires a measured, flexible response on the part of the 
U.S. Navy and its combined and joint allies and partners across the many dimensions of 
conflict.  
Accordingly, this study also considers the wider strategic implications of Russian 
policy and strategy for the posture and order of battle of the U.S. Navy and allied 
maritime forces. It also pays attention to certain vessels, aircraft, and weapons as well as 
other forms of aggression by irregular forces. This challenge in its 21st century form is a 
                                                                                                                                            
Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics, 2018), 
https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/LRE%20Executive%20Summary__Final.pdf.  
5 Kathleen Hicks et al., Part 1: Campaigning in the Grey Zone (Washington, DC: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2019), https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/Hicks_GrayZone_interior_v4_FULL_WEB.pdf. Also see: John Arquilla et al., Russian 




profound departure from attempts mounted in the 20th century by other navies6 to thwart 
sea control on a global scale with vessels, aircraft, and weapons closely resembling those 
of the U.S. Navy and allied fleets.  
Russian aims are clear: to unseat U.S. global military and naval dominance. In the 
littoral waters of Eurasia as well as in other theaters, Russian maritime forces seek not 
just to defend Russia but to exercise influence in the “near abroad” and beyond (e.g., in 
Syria). Russia also pursues cooperation with China as a means to this end. This challenge 
does not take the form of a high seas,7 blue-water navy, as might be said to be manifest in 
the case of the People’s Republic of China or in the Soviet navy of the 1970s. For this 
reason, the character of the Russian maritime threat is diffuse and requires an acute 
analysis of its political and strategic facets, which is the aim of this paper.  
 
 
                                               
6 Sam J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2013); Sam LaGrone, “CNO Richardson: Navy Shelving A2/AD Acronym, USNI News, 
October 3, 2016, https://news.usni.org/2016/10/03/cno-richardson-navy-shelving-a2ad-acronym.  
7 See Steven Miller and Stephen Van Evera, eds. Naval Strategy and National Security: An Intentional 
Security Reader (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988); Sean Maloney, Securing Command of the 
Sea: NATO Naval Planning, 1948–1954 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995); John B. Hattendorf 
and Geoffery Till, “Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century,” Naval War College Review 67 no. 4 
(2014): Article 10; John B. Hattendorf, The Evolution of U.S. Navy’s Maritime Strategy, 1977–1986 
(Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 2004), 22.  
 4 
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 5 
II. ANTI ACESS AND AREA DENIAL IN RUSSIAN DOCTRINE?  
Importantly, no such term as “anti access and area denial” appears in the prolific 
pages of Russian military scientific analyses or in the speeches of high-ranking military 
or civilian leaders.8 If Russia’s leadership declines to describe its military objectives as 
such, perhaps we should follow its lead (as suggested by outgoing Chief of Naval 
Operations [CNO] John Richardson).9 As Giles and Boulegue observed in the summer of 
2019,10 “anti access and area denial” has been imposed by the United States and North 
                                               
8 As an introduction to Russian military affairs, see the reading list from the Oxford Center for 
Changing Character of War, “CCW Russia’s Reading List,” September 2018, 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55faab67e4b0914105347194/t/5c9b9a1cf9619ac42591ca9a/1553701
524437/CCW+Russia+Reading+List+5+-+March+2019.pdf. An analysis of the contemporary Russian 
Navy is: Konstantin Bogdanov and Ilya Kramnik, The Russian Navy in the 21st Century: The Legacy and 
the New Path (Washington DC: Center for Naval Analyses, 2018). Among the generation of new Russian 
experts in the U.S. government, the work of Michael Kofman has been useful for this paper, while many 
other online sources are dubious, sensationalist, and lacking in knowledge of the character and history of 
war as well as military and naval organizations. See Michael Kofman, Russian Military Analysis (blog, 
World Press), https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/. As this author is a veteran of the epoch of the 
1960s until 1980s and for a work of this kind, is both intriguing and challenging to distinguish what is 
substantial and what is propaganda given the amount of English language material from Russian sources in 
the 21st century.  
Contact for the Department of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation for Citizens Affairs is 
Kolymazhnyy Pereulok, 14, Moscow, 119019; Phone: 8 (495) 696-12-32. The Information Desk of the 
Ministry of Defence phone number is 8 (495) 696-88-00. Both can be found at 
https://eng.mil.ru/en/contacts.htm. The statement of Russian naval policy for the year 2017 can be found (in 
Russian) at “Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 20.07.2017 № 327 ‘Об утверждении Основ 
государственной политики Российской Федерации в области военно-морской деятельности на 
период до 2030 года [Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of July 20, 2017 No. 327 ‘On 
approval of the Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the field of naval activities for 
the period until 2030’],” July 20, 2017, 
http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201707200015?index=0&rangeSize=1&mc_cid=8db
d8574d4&mc_eid=3baefa44e9.  
This document is interpreted in Richard Connolly, Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian 
Federation in the Field of Naval Activities for the Period until 2030, Russian Studies Series NATO 
Defense College, No. 2/19 (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2019), 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/research/research.php?icode=574#_edn1.  
9 LaGrone, “CNO Richardson.”  
10 Keir Giles and Mathieu Boulegue, “Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities: Real and Imagined,” Parameters, 
49, no. 1–2 (Summer 2019): 21–36. Also see Said Aminov, “Russian Area Denial Zones Concept in ADA2 
Terms,” Moscow Defense Brief No. 6/68 (2018) 
https://mdb.cast.ru/search/?word=Area+Denial+&data%5Ball%5D=all; Tomasz Smura, Russian Anti 
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Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on Russian military thought in part because the 
U.S. side now has escalation dominance in professional military education and also 
because of a universe of bloggers and amateur defense experts who cloud our thinking 
about the levels of war.11  
Russian strategic analysts integrate the three levels of war (strategic, tactical, and 
operational) to maximize a variety of forces and weapons in all dimensions of crisis, 
tension, war, and the seizure of victory.12 Within this view of theaters of war and combat 
operations, the Russian command has combined and integrated maritime defense and 
territorial forces. A central feature of this force structure is what Russia calls “cross 
domain standoff” weapons.13 These forces include antisubmarine warfare, conventional 
submarines well suited to engage capital ships, air and coastal defense missiles, and other 
projectiles of redundant power and depth. Such missiles and other weapons are 
complemented by highly modern and brutally effective electronic countermeasures.14 In 
the hallowed tradition of Soviet practice with strategic defenses in the territory of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Access Area Denial (A2AD) Capabilities: Implications for NATO, Pulaski Policy Paper No. 29 (Warsaw: 
Casimir Pulaski Foundation, 2016), https://pulaski.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Pulaski_Policy_Paper_No_29_16_EN.pdf.  
11 Giles and Boulegue, “Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities,” 32–36. The authors in the Parameters article 
comment on the degree to which U.S. military affairs social media is, in fact, a platform for Russian 
psychological operations, a comment with which the authors of the present study can well identify.  
12 David Jeffrey Kern, “Soviet Naval Operational Art” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey: 1988), 14; Office of Naval Intelligence, The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition (Washington 
DC: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2015), 
https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/russia/Russia%202015screen.pdf?ver=2015-12-14-
082028-313.  
13 Giles and Boulegue, “Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities,” 21–24; Dimitry Adamsky, Cross Domain 
Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy, Proliferation Papers 54 (Paris: Institut Français des 
Relations Internationales, 2015), https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp54adamsky.pdf.  
14 The Ukrainians have found in fighting the Russians, that the Russians have sophisticated electronic 
warfare and can attack or retaliate with remarkable speed—something the United States does not match and 
does not yet understand. Amos C. Fox, “Cyborgs at Little Stalingrad”: A Brief History of the Battle of the 
Donetsk Airport, Land Warfare Paper No. 125 (Leavenworth, KA: Institute of Land Warfare, 2019), 12–18.  
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Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies, air defense of ground forces in 
width and depth constitute standard Russian practice. This capacity of air and aerospace 
defense extends to ground and air forces that capture the opponent’s territory.  
Russian military and naval doctrine today extend the previous Soviet practice of 
strategic and operational concentric circles, particularly in the maritime domain. This 
strategy betrays Clausewitz’s dictum about the strength of the defensive and represents a 
response to U.S. tendencies, since the 1990–1991 Gulf War, to use aerospace power as 
well as maritime and land power to wage war in various campaigns. America’s patterns 
of conducting wars have enabled the Russian military to reflect with care and precision 
on the most efficient countermeasures.15 Russia’s resort to the tradition of employing the 
advantages of geography to blunt the attacking power has its own logic that emphasizes 
deterrence and even compellence—as is classical with the defense and defenses. Since 
Western militaries and navies have emphasized the counterterror and light, expeditionary 
warfare paradigm in the last generation, the Russian revival of its defensive and offensive 
forces and posture has gone little remarked. Because so many forces, weapons, and units 
previously devoted to the full range of warfare and combat with Russian forces fell to the 
axe in the decades since 1991, the costs of projecting Western power around the 
periphery of Eurasia is comparatively greater than at the time of the mature U.S./NATO 
force structure of the 1960s or the 1980s.  
Russia’s 21st century scheme is to fight outnumbered and win against its more 
numerous enemies. In the maritime domain, Russia’s emphasis falls rather less on the 
                                               
15 Roger McDermott, “Gerasimov Outlines Russian General Staff Perspectives on Future Warfare,” 
Eurasian Daily Monitor 15, no. 50 (2018): https://jamestown.org/program/gerasimov-outlines-russian-
general-staffs-perspectives-on-future-warfare/. Also see, Roger McDermott, “Gerasimov Appeals for 
Military Science to Forge New Forms of Combat,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 16, no. 34 (2019), 
https://jamestown.org/program/gerasimov-appeals-for-military-science-to-forge-new-forms-of-combat/.  
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grandeur of capital ships and more on a jeune ecole posture16 of frigates and corvettes. In 
turn, these are greatly bolstered by land maritime defenses: standoff missiles, land attack 
cruise missiles, as well as surface to surface anti-ship cruise missiles. Examined in some 
detail in the section here on Kaliningrad, these weapons are joined not only by modern 
antisubmarine warfare forces, but also a variety of defensive and offensive weapons 
systems. Finally, the offensive and defensive aspects of these maritime operational 
barricades reside in lethal and sobering mix of new and newest short-range surface to 
surface missiles, such as the modernized Iskander, as well as the long-range defensive, 
and also simultaneously offensive, S-400 Triumf rocket weapon system analyzed later.  
These weapons and their method of employment underpin a coercive and 
aggressive foreign policy and military/maritime posture, which, in turn, underpins 
strategy to undermine and weaken the West. The anti access and area denial order of 
battle and posture of Russian maritime and land forces with a maritime orientation (i.e., 
coastal defense) acts as a strategic coercive deterrent. These forces and weapons 
constitute an extension of classic Russian practice of preventing enemy fleets from freely 
descending on home shores. For example, these forces are designed to impose significant 
costs on U.S. and allied forces compelled to project power across the Atlantic, into the 
Arctic Sea, or into the Sea of Okhotsk.  
Quite simply, it remains far from clear whether Russia’s weapons can be 
successfully countered in various power projection scenarios.17 In this connection, the 
                                               
16 Theodore Ropp, The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy 1871–1904 (Annapolis, 
MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987).  
17 Shaplak and Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence. Also, for the critique of same see Michael Kofman, 




Russian navy is well able to counter the classic threat to a blue-water navy of capital 
ships18 using smaller, fast warships armed previously with torpedoes19 and now with 
missiles of all kinds. This posture enables what has recently (but also in the past, of 
course) been described as “swarming.”20 In addition, as the U.S. Navy and other NATO 
navies continue to place a great emphasis on extremely costly capital ships as the ideal 
means to project power on a global scale, the power of the continental/maritime defensive 
has increased, as the Russian case21 has demonstrated painfully in the last decade(as has 
the Chinese case, which is outside the scope of this survey). The Russian side has again 
reverted to the former Soviet practice to procure and deploy a fleet of smaller, less 
expensive, and numerous warships. The weapons on these platforms are long-range, 
precision projectiles/missiles to defeat an assaulting U.S. or NATO fleet in the Cold War 
waters of the Atlantic, Arctic, and the Pacific. This is to say nothing of the constricted 
waters of the Baltic and Black Seas and elsewhere in what was once the maritime frontier 
of the Soviet Union, now a “grey zone” of contention.22 This order of battle at sea can 
potentially overwhelm the numerically fewer but more combat capable U.S. Navy capital 
                                               
18 See sources Giles and Boulegue, “Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities;” Aminov, “Russian Area Denial;” 
Smura, Russian Anti Access; Richard Connolly, “The Kalibrisation of the Russian Navy: Progress and 
Prospects,” Oxford Center for Contemporary War, February 2019, 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55faab67e4b0914105347194/t/5c62ee054785d35b410281cf/1549987
334234/Connolly+Kalibrisation.pdf.  
19 In the late 19th century and early 20th century, more or less small warships had the same tactical traits 
of submarines but as surface vessels. Fred T. Jane, ed. Jane’s Fighting Ships (London: Samson & Lowe, 
1908), 95.  
20 James Stavridis, “The United States, the Atlantic and Maritime Hybrid Warfare,” in NATO and the 
North Atlantic: Revitalizing Collective Defense, White Hall Paper No. 87, ed. John Andreas Olsen, 92–101 
(London: Royal United Services Institute, 2017); Giles and Boulegue, “Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities,” 92–
100.  
21 See the Chinese statement of security and defense at State Council Information Office of the 
People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in the New Era (Beijing: State Publisher, 2019), 7.  
22 For contemporary warship types, see: Stephen Saunders, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships Yearbook 2018–
2019 (London: IHS Markit, 2018). For an examination of the term grey zone, see Hicks et al., Part 1: 
Campaigning.  
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ships or the ships, aircraft, and missiles of U.S. allies and partners whose staggering 
expense poses severe limits to a swift and certain maritime response in great power 
conflict. The mass of Russian smaller warships with their potent armament of most 
modern design for littoral waters, deployed close to Russia and its sphere of influence. 
Such vessels augment land fortifications and long-range defensive and offensive missiles, 
which create anti access, aerospace, defense rings at the theater level.  
This maritime fighting power also allows Russian maritime forces to project 
power into the maritime or continental sphere of the near abroad (i.e., into the Baltic, the 
Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, and the Sea of Japan). This has 
already happened, for instance, with the show of fire connected with the Syrian campaign 
in 2015–2016. Such a defensive/offensive operational/strategic effort will pose a serious 
challenge for U.S. maritime might to project power in a mid- to high-intensity conflict 
with Russia in the scenarios most frequently analyzed in the open sources since the 
annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the revival of intense military and maritime planning 
for an armed conflict with Russia.  
Taken to its extreme, Russia’s new generation of submarine-launched hypersonic 
missiles, in combination with former Soviet nuclear weapons, threaten U.S. national 
survival.23 These weapons are combined with a global barrage of cyber aggression, in the 
form of multiple sophisticated electronic attacks from the Russian military 
counterintelligence in Petersburg, maintain a steady barrage against the morale and will 
of the Western democracies. 
                                               
23 Ben Werner, “U.S. Warship Shadowing High-End Russian Frigate Near Cuba,” U.S. Naval Institute 
News, June 25, 2019 https://news.usni.org/2019/06/25/u-s-warship-shadowing-high-end-russian-frigate-
near-cuba.  
 11 
Shortly after the Crimean occupation in early 2014, amid a period of muddled 
Western strategy and military operations in Iraq24 and Syria, and amid the explosion of 
the Syrian war into the heart of Central Europe via the refugee crisis in 2015,25 the 
Russians intervened in the Syrian civil war to protect their classic strategic position 
dating from the Soviet era.26 Aimed at undermining a dominant U.S. position in the 
Middle East, this Russian operation brought to prominence figures from Vladimir Putin’s 
inner circle of secret service cronies and commandoes, Yevgeny Prigozhin and the 
equally idealized ex commando Lieutenant Colonel Dmitry Utkin.27 While the operation 
looked to take advantage of strategic circumstance, it also drew upon classic Russian and 
Soviet strategy and tactics as a southern oriented strategy of great power conflict (i.e., the 
Eastern Question) as well as the first use of “volunteers” as an inexpensive means of 
Soviet power. To this classic constellation is joined the roles and missions of Russian 
irregular forces in Latin America and Africa28 (all with echoes of the 1960s and 1970s). 
This 21st century version of Russian “volunteers” (as they were called) as found in the 
Spanish Civil War in the 1930s, or in the Korean and Vietnam wars when Russians were 
                                               
24 Andrew Weiss and Nichole Ng, Collision Avoidance: Lessons from U.S. and Russian Operations in 
Syria (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2019), 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/03/20/collision-avoidance-lessons-of-u.s.-and-russian-operations-in-
syria-pub-78571.  
25 Karthika Sasikumar and Danjjela Dudley, eds., Political and Military Sociology: The European 
Refugee Crisis (New York: Routledge, 2019).  
26 Dmitry Adamsky, Moscow’s Syria Campaign: Russian Lessons for the Art of Strategy, Russie.Nei. 
Visions Paper No. 109 (Paris: Ifri, 2018), 
https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/rnv_109_adamsky_moscow_syria_campaign_2018.pdf.  
27 Sergey Sukhankin, “War, Business, and ‘Hybrid’ Warfare: The Case of the Wagner Private Military 
Company (Part One),” Eurasia Daily Monitor 15, no. 60 (2019), https://jamestown.org/program/war-
business-and-hybrid-warfare-the-case-of-the-wagner-private-military-company-part-one/.  
28 Elizabeth Schmidt, Foreign Intervention in Africa: From the Cold War to the War on Terror 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Pavel Luzin, “Gravitating toward ‘Failed States’” Riddle, 
August 31, 2018, https://www.ridl.io/en/gravitating-toward-failed-states/.  
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deployed in numbers to the fighting fronts in the two Asian countries,29 underscores the 
role of classical irregular warfare and soldiers of fortune. This is one of the classic forms 
of military organization with an inherently aggressive and self-referring center of gravity. 
Russia takes advantage of a variety of paramilitary organizations to further its 
objectives around the world. These paramilitary entities are operating either on the basis 
of plunder and following their own sense of profit and violence, or as a traditional and 
well-oiled weapon of policy as an arm of plausible deniability for the Russian Ministry of 
Defense. They may well be self-sustaining in a manner that would gladden any past 
soldier of fortune. These organizations provoke flash points and crises in the twilight 
realm of war (or grey zones) and also divert and bind up security and internal military 
forces, including those in the maritime realm. Despite the appearance of plausible 
deniability as part of a statecraft of konspiration (conspiracy) and maskirovka (Russian 
military deception), 30  the irregular combatants, fifth-columnists, and mercenaries 
constitute a direct extension of Russian foreign policy.31 
Soldiers who live by conquest booty are actually a very old form of military 
organization that the Russian government employs in contemporary warfare amid the rise 
of state security/pistolero-kleptocratic state capitalism in globalization.32 It should come 
                                               
29 Central Intelligence Agency, Report on Organization, Operations, Equipment, and Strategic and 
Tactical Planning of North Vietnamese Antiaircraft Defense System (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence 
Agency, 1967).  
30 Roger Beaumont, Maskirovka: Soviet Concealment, Deception and Camouflage (College Station: 
Texas A & M Press, 1982).  
31 Raphael Cohen and Andrew Radin, Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe Understanding the Threat, 
RAND Paper RR1793-2 (Santa Monica: RAND, 2019), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1793.html; David Parrott, The Business of War: Military 
Enterprise and the Military Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
32 Defense economy in Russia compared to the United States or NATO allies. Sergey Sukhankin, War, 
Business, and Ideology: How Russian Private Military Contractors Pursue Moscow’s Interests, War by 
Other Means Series (Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/war-
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as no surprise that these Russian mercenary operations are apparently self-sustaining, 
when say, compared to missions of joint and combined aerospace and maritime forward 
presence as mounted by the United States and its regional allies. These inexpensive and 
high-visibility echelons boast the capability for intense strategic nuisance and can impose 
additional costs on the United States, allies, and partner forces who are already 
overextended by the irregular warfare requirements around the world. Russian 
commando mercenaries and freebooters can suddenly appear at a maritime strategic 
choke point (followed by aircraft spotters online).33 They contain a surprise factor and 
also sap the energies of the defenders of global order (ourselves) in the problem of 
overextension and underfunded and undermanned maritime forces. Nuisance and raids on 
a wide geopolitical scale complete with the maritime aspect in places like Venezuela, 
where the spoiler role of Cuba in former times is supplanted by the irritant of irregular 
warfare and the maritime dimension in the Caribbean has strategic value far beyond its 
minor cost in terms of personnel and strategic effect gained for a nuisance level of effort.  
The Russians believe that the U.S. side will do nothing about these unsavory and 
colorful freebooters. Moreover, such men at arms for hire, defiant of some coherent 
political direction from constituted authority, are infamous for seeking out new areas of 
adventure and more booty. This fact gives them, as military desperados, a strategic 
aggressiveness that cannot be contradicted, especially when such figures gain a seat in 
defense decision making, as has happened in selected cases in the past.  
                                                                                                                                            
business-and-ideology-how-russian-private-military-contractors-pursue-moscows-interests/; Nathaniel 
Reynolds, “Are Russia Mercenaries a Threat to U.S. interests,” Carnegie Endowment, June 24, 2019, 
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/07/17/are-russia-s-mercenaries-threat-to-u.s.-interests-pub-79493.  




Framing Russia’s military strategy and the means to carry it out are the economic 
limits of Putin’s ambition for his nation to impose its will on the United States and its 
allies in the maritime and continental realms. Some argue that Russia finds itself in 
geopolitical, economic, and demographic decline,34 boasting a gross domestic product 
(GDP) the size of Italy, and a shrinking population in the face of those of the United 
States or China, or even a united Europe. On the other hand, it is hard to ignore that 
Putin’s strategy is carefully bounded by Russia’s limited resources, meaning that it can be 
sustained for the foreseeable future. This fact arises from reality that these anti access and 
area denial operations and procurements are cheaper than the U.S. and allied means 
needed to defeat them.  
Most of the policies, strategies, forces and, weapons that became part of the 
Russian offensive in 2008 were readily at hand as part of an offensive planned a while 
ago (that is, well prior to 2014 and Crimea). This strategic offensive with defensive 
elements can be sustained by Russian GDP and with the destructive forces in society 
(e.g., demographic decline and inveterate corruption, which is a source of loud protest as 
this study has been written in the year 2019).35  
                                               
34 S. Enders Wimbush and Elizabeth M. Portale, eds. Russia in Decline (Washington DC, Jamestown 
Foundation, 2017). For example, see Nicholas Eberstadt, Demography and Human Resources: Unforgiving 
Constraints for a Russia in Decline, Russia in Decline Project Series (Washington, DC: Jamestown 
Foundation, 2016) https://jamestown.org/program/demography-human-resources-unforgiving-constraints-
russia-decline/.  
35 Andrew Higgins, “Hundreds Arrested in Moscow as Criminal Case is Brought Against Opposition 
Leader,” New York Times, August 3, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/03/world/europe/moscow-
protest-navalny-corruption.html; Ray Furlong, “Beatings and Arrests at Latest Moscow Protests,” Radio 
Free Europe, August 3, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-moscow-protests/30090705.html.  
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A. FROM THE BEACHES OF NORMANDY TO THE PHILIPPINE SEA 
AND TO CRIMEA: ANTI ACCESS/AREA DENIAL TOUR DE HORIZON IN 
JUNE 2019  
In the days prior to the June 2019 Normandy celebration, NATO headquarters in 
Mons and Naples mounted its customary Baltic exercise.36 The recently resurrected U.S. 
2nd Fleet37 out of Norfolk, Virginia played a central role in this exercise. A relic of a 
forgotten maritime zone of contention of the Cold War, the venerable BALTOPS 
evolution38 has become a flash point of great power conflict due to Russia’s persistent 
threat to the Baltic states.39 It needs to be emphasized that Russia’s historical memory,40 
or strategic and operational outlook, informs its threat to the Baltic amid the post-2014 
buildup of enhanced forward presence and a return of the U.S. Navy to this theater of 
war.  
Thousands and miles away during the BALTOPS exercise, Russia attempted to 
deny the U.S. Navy access and areas to which it has been accustomed for decades. For 
                                               
36 Sukhankin, “War, Business, and ‘Hybrid’ Warfare;” NATO, Key NATO and Allied Exercises in 
2019,” February 2019, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_02/1902-
factsheet_exercises_en.pdf; “NATO Navies Test Readiness in Baltic Sea,” NATO, June 9, 2019, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_166717.htm; “U.S., Sweden Conduct Reconnaissance in Baltic 
Drill Near Russia’s Border,” Sputnik, October 6, 2019, 
https://sputniknews.com/military/201906101075774909-us-sweden-baltic-sea-reconnaissance/;”Russian 
Baltic Fleet to Monitor NATO Naval Drills ‘Baltops-2019,’” TASS, June 10, 2019, 
https://tass.com/defense/1063232.  
37 “CNO Announces Establishment of U.S. 2nd Fleet,” press release NNS1800504-15, U.S. Navy, May 
4, 2018, https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=105453.  
38 “NATO Navies Test Readiness in Baltic Sea,” NATO, last updated June 8, 2019, 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_166717.htm.  
39 On the history of the Baltic as a scene of world power, see Michael North, The Baltic: A History, 
trans. Kenneth Kronenberg (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015); James S. Corum, Olaf 
Mertelsmann, and Kaarel Piirimae, eds., The Second World War and the Baltic States, Tartu Historical 
Studies, Vol. 4 (Berlin: Peter Lang, 2014); Marinearchiv, eds. Der Krieg zur See 1914–1918 [The War at 
Sea]- Der Krieg in der Ostsee [the War in the Baltic Sea] Band 1 [part 1]: Von Kriegsbeginn bis Mitte 
März 1915 [From the beginning of the war until mid-March 1915 ] (Berlin: E S Mittler and Sohn, 1921).  
40 Kern, “Soviet Naval Operational Art,” 65–73. The literature on the age of the total war in the Baltic 
is mixed, and there is no useful summary for a beginning student of the subject in the English language 
across a significant span of time as a guide to practice. Nonetheless, see Friedrich Ruge, The Soviets as 
Naval Opponents, 1941–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979).  
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instance, in the blue expanse of the Philippine Sea, a Russian destroyer41 suddenly 
appeared beside a U.S. guided missile cruiser during aircraft recovery operations. 
Contrary to the good customs of seamanship hammered out over decades, the Russian 
warship maneuvered dangerously close to the USS Chancellorsville. While the 
Chancellorsville avoided a collision with the reckless Russian destroyer, at the same time 
(and well recorded by the cameras), a handful of the Russian crew, with the bravado so 
typical found in social media, posed in their swimming wear in deck chairs on the flying 
deck of their own vessel.42 The moment became instantly memorialized in the social 
media battle-field of psychological warfare and propaganda that surrounds contemporary 
military and naval operations—a classic Russian method aimed at undermining the 
legitimacy of U.S. naval operations on a worldwide basis.43 
In the same week that the June Normandy event recalled the joint and combined 
effort of the western Allies against Axis Europe, and the Russian destroyer buzzed the 
U.S. Navy cruiser in the contested seas of East Asia, unsettling news about missiles and 
old/new bunkers emerged in press reports44 detailing a Russian buildup on Crimea in the 
Black Sea. The reports revealed an extensive Russian effort to build their version of a 
Gibraltar on the Black Sea. Defense One further reported that five S-400 batteries had 
                                               
41 “U.S. Russian Navy Ship Maneuvers Unsafe, Unprofessional,” press release, Commander, U.S. 
Pacific Fleet, June 7, 2019, https://www.cpf.navy.mil/news.aspx/040050.  
42 The Russian navy claimed that the U.S. cruiser was at fault. See “U.S. Vessel Had Right of Way in 
Incident with Russian Destroyer,” Polygraph.Info, June 12, 2019, www.polygraph.info/a/fact-check-us-
Navy-incident-russian-destroyer/29996020.html.  
43 Andrew Higgins, Megan Specia, and Thomas Gibbons, “Russian and U.S. Navy Ships Narrowly 
Avoid Collision in Philippine Sea, New York Times, June 7, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/07/world/asia/navy-ships-war-russia-usa.html; John B. Greene “Victory 
at Sea in the Grey Zone: Russian Force and Mass Persuasion in the Maritime and Littoral Realms and the 
NATO and U.S. Navy Response” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, forthcoming in 2020).  
44 “Russia to Rearm Soviet Coastal Defense System in Crimea with New Missiles,” TASS, May 28, 
2019, https://tass.com/defense/1060365.  
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been emplaced along with further troop units as well as aircraft, but also had undertaken 
significant modernization of old Soviet fortifications for anti-ship missiles.45 While these 
measures are at once postured along defensive lines and in custom with Soviet practice,46 
they also have a clear offensive purpose directed against NATO and Western forces. As 
noted by a recent head of U.S. Army Europe, fortifications in Crimea also serve as base 
from which to project power to the Middle East and beyond. Maritime support for 
Russia’s Syrian operation relies on Black Sea bases.  
The evolving Russian fortress in Crimea also engages the geopolitical and 
MacKinder-oriented Chinese Eurasian grand strategy of sea, road, and rail to forge an 
autarkic Russian-Chinese Grossraumwirtschaft47 in which the Black Sea would serve as a 
pivot between Asia and Europe. In this way, the weapons and forces of anti access and 
area denial in this province of a strategically resurgent Russia in southern Europe lunge 
from the tactical defensive stance to an offensive, geopolitical stance that, on the strategic 
level, undermines U.S. maritime power in a manner that breaks with the experience of 
war and peace in the last generation. The fixation in the strategic chattering classes with 
the signal role of Russian special forces or digital storm troops and their bloodless coups 
de main obscures the real strategic issue at hand (i.e., the possibility of a mid to high 
                                               
45“Russia to Rearm Soviet Coastal Defense, TASS; Patrick Tucker, “U.S. Intelligence Officials and 
Satellite Photos Detail Russian Military Buildup on Crimea,” Defense One, June 12, 2019, 
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2019/06/exclusive-satellite-photos-detail-russian-military-buildup-
crimea/157642/.  
46 Kern, “Soviet Naval Operational Art;” Reuters, “In Crimea, Russia Signals Military Resolve with 
New and revamped Bases,” Unian Information Agency, November 1, 2016, 
https://www.unian.info/war/1601376-reuters-special-report-russia-signals-military-resolve-in-crimea.html.  
47Grossraumwirtschaft is the Nazi geopolitical term that might well encapsulate the “one belt, one 
road,” initiative of the Chinese attempt to exert strategic influence in Eurasia. Friedrich Bülow, 
Grossraumwirtschaft, Weltwirtschaft und Raumordnung [Large-Scale Economy, World Economy and 
Regional Planning] (Leipzig: K. F. Koehler, 1941). The most prominent advocate of this view of strategy in 
the U.S. today is Robert Kaplan, The Return of Marco Polo’s World: War, Strategy, and American 
Interests (New York: Random House, 2018).  
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intensity war on a very wide front, including nuclear weapons), and this issue was in play 
at the beginning of June 2019 to make a mockery of nostalgia for the defeat in the West 
of fortress Europe long ago. In this sense, one does well to reconsider what freedom of 
the seas for the U.S. and its allies and the role of naval forces in this strategic goal 
actually means for a world that has begun fundamentally to misunderstand truths about 
power and conflict.  
B. ANTI ACCESS AND AREA DENIAL: WHAT IS AT STAKE FOR THE 
U.S. NAVY, WHY IT MATTERS  
The foundation of U.S. global influence is sea power.48 Ever since the U.S. 
embarked on a two-ocean navy over a century ago, the expectation to wage war and 
secure victory far from home, has depended on warships, aircraft, missiles, and maritime 
forces of great size and cost.49 Since the Atlantic Charter in 1941, maritime allies of great 
strength have added to the power of the U.S. Navy and continue to do so today. These 
forces in their total of air, land, sea, and space forces boast strength unmatched by this 
nation’s foes, but for how long?  
A host of new technologies—artificial intelligence, cyber operations, autonomous 
vehicles, and additive manufacturing, among others—will almost certainly undermine or 
alter the role of warships just as rapid technological change has done in previous years. A 
global U.S. Navy must be balanced in its vessels and fighting power across the spectrum 
                                               
48 The following is adapted from “U.S. Seapower in the Contemporary Maritime Environment,” 
Donald Abenheim et al., “American Sea Power in the Contemporary Security Environment,” Comparative 
Strategy 37, no. 5 (2018): 391–403.  
49 George Baer, One Hundred Years of Sea Power: The U.S. Navy, 1890–1990 (Palo Alto: Stanford 
University Press, 1993). Also see Peter Haynes, Towards A New Maritime Strategy: American Naval 
Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2015); and James Russell et al., Navy 
Strategy Development: Strategy in the 21st Century (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2015), 
https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/45622.  
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of conflict so that it can undertake diplomacy and reassurance operations, littoral warfare, 
naval control, protection of shipping, and power projection, which includes waging 
combat with a major power well equipped with sophisticated forces intended to defeat 
such a maritime force. This fleet must further include strike aviation or long-range strike 
in support of land campaigns as the U.S. Navy has undertaken in the Iraq and 
Afghanistan conflicts or which might be necessary in a future great power conflict of mid 
intensity or high intensity. The U.S. Navy has focused on the irregular wars on land for 
so long that it has lost sight of the reality of war at sea and the principles of sea power as 
these are reasserting themselves in Eurasia—even as a host of emerging new technologies 




                                               
50 For example, see Jeffrey E. Kline and Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., “Between Peace and the Air-Sea Battle: 
A War at Sea Strategy,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2012): 35–51.  
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III. SOURCES OF RUSSIAN CONFLICT: POLICY, STRATEGY, 
AND TACTICS 
Because expertise about Russia in the U.S. government has hardly been in great 
demand since 1991,51 that knowledge has largely atrophied on an institutional basis in the 
national security establishment.52 A good place to begin to resurrect that expertise is with 
a 2019 assessment of Russia’s Eurasianist strategy offered by former Swedish Prime 
Minister Carl Bildt.53  
In view of the various crises since 2014 (Crimea, refugee crisis, Brexit, 
nationalism versus multinational statecraft, “America First” redux, and uncertainty about 
U.S. led alliance statecraft in the world turmoil) joined with forthcoming elections and 
changes of government in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States in 2020, Bildt turned his gaze to the Kremlin. This was before Putin gave a self-
congratulatory talk to the London Financial Times, wherein he more or less announced 
the defeat of the politics of enlightenment, human rights, and the ideals in both Magna 
Carta and the U.S. Bill of Rights as if he had shot an old crippled elephant on a game 
                                               
51 See Robert Legvold, ed., Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past 
(New York: Columbia University Press,2007); Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of 
Great Power Politics (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield: 2009); Alexei Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign 
Policy. Change and Continuity in National Identity, 2nd ed. (Plymouth, UK: Rowman and Littlefield: 
2010); Angela Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015); Angela Stent, Putin’s World: Russia against the West 
(New York: Hachette, 2019). 
52 See discussion of post-1991 difficulties of Western analysis of Russian and Soviet military affairs in 
Gudrun Persson, “The War of the Future: A Conceptual Framework and Practical Conclusions: Essays of 
Strategic Thought,” NATO Defense College, last updated October 2, 2018, 
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hunt. The Swedish statesman and European diplomat posed the question of what Putin 
and his government will do until the year 2024 in the face of these shifts in the ministries 
of the West. This question is especially relevant now that the U.S. side speaks more 
openly of great power competition and has embarked on a diplomacy of economic 
confrontation as well as a neo-nationalistic policy that appears to break with its statecraft 
formulated in the epoch 1945–1991. This at the same time the bulwarks of Western 
determination are at risk because of great power threats in Europe, the Middle East and 
Asia, and, perhaps, most fatefully, because domestic political voices54 in major Western 
democracies openly associate themselves with the Eurasianist ideological goals of Putin’s 
statecraft. With a citation of a study by the Primakov Institute,55 Bildt suggests that 
priority in Putin’s Moscow of the past decade has been the preservation and improvement 
in the so called “world hierarchy of powers and responsibility” (i.e., its return to the rank 
of the premiere world powers in a multipolar world). In this connection, the Russian 
analysts foresee a protracted and long political struggle with the Western democracies for 
Russia’s position in eastern Europe, Central Asia, and beyond.  
This conflict demands an orientation of statecraft and strategy eastward across 
Eurasia to the lodestar in Beijing as is implied by the ideal of Eurasianism as a rejection 
of the West and the collective security/collective defense and international economic 
order of the years 1944–1991 as conceived by the Western allies who became the NATO 
allies and pillars of the Bretton Woods system of world trade. Moreover, Bildt observes 
                                               
54 See Legvold, Russian Foreign Policy; Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy; Tsygankov, Russia’s 
Foreign Policy; Stent, The Limits of Partnership; Stent, Putin’s World.  
55 Florence Gaub, ed., Global Trends for 2030: Challenges and Choices for Europe (Brussels: 
European Strategy and Analysis System, 2019), 
https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/sites/epsc/files/espas_report2019.pdf cited in Bildt, “Russia’s Strategic Priorities.” 
The Primakov Institute is also known as Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the 
Russian Academy of Sciences; see https://www.imemo.ru/en/about.  
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that the Primakov geoeconomic analysts see no exit in this confrontation with the West in 
which the chief goals are the perpetual revanchist conflict with Ukraine, Georgia and, by 
implication, with the Baltics NATO allies and beyond.56 This conflict is an upshot of fate 
with a heavy price and must be paid by present and future generations to assure Russia as 
a world power and not a vassal of a ruthless Washington. Bildt sees that the geopolitical 
thinkers in the Kremlin are digging in for the long haul of revanche and revisionism.57 In 
Bildt’s view, they are apparently digging in regardless of how such a policy retards the 
nation’s rank in the world as seen from Washington or Brussels; or, more fatefully, how 
long such a campaign of intimidation and force with no or really very few shots fired in 
anger could eventually harm the Russian economic capacity to mount such this effort. 
However, such a rational and balance sheet kind of view, versus an emphasis on power in 
its naked sense and upon prestige and status in an older order of Europe and the world 
does not seem to matter all that much in a Kremlin that does or does not in the year 2019 
have grasped the initiative after decades of what it deems to be a statecraft of American 
hegemony. Hence, the citation of the Holy Alliance, of Metternich and Alexander, or of 
Bismarck as heard among those who are foes of Thomas Friedman’s globalization and 
internationalism.58 
                                               
56 Bildt, “Russia’s Strategic Priorities.” See also Legvold, Russian Foreign Policy; Mankoff, Russian 
Foreign Policy; Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy; Stent, The Limits of Partnership; Stent, Putin’s 
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Bildt notes that this geopolitical revisionism intended to lessen (or, indeed, to 
undo) the sting of the years 1989–1991 provides no logic for the efficacious course of 
Russian prosperity in alignment with the West.59 What matters most is then not the 
perspective of decades, but the here and now of headlines and who can count coup at the 
expense of Western capitals in the fata morgana of status and power on the 19th century 
stripe.60  
Another informed observer of Russia’s strategy and its underlying motivations is 
Carnegie’s Eugene Rumer. As early as 1995, Rumer speculated that the end of détente 
and entente of the heady epoch 1987–1991 would be followed by statecraft wherein 
Moscow first would begin to drift and then to swerve away from the promise of Western 
integration to return to great power conflict with a primacy of national geostrategic 
security goals.61 Such a statecraft of the mid-1990s, in Rumer’s view, as seen from the 
heights of the Kremlin around what had been the former Soviet Union eager to associate 
itself with Washington, Brussels, and Berlin placed the so called “Russia's immediate 
periphery” and a waxing desire to “rebuild Russia's sphere of influence.”62 Rumer well 
saw at this moment that the growing friction between the optimism of the Clinton 
                                               
59 Bildt, “Russia’s Strategic Priorities.”  
60 See below for the discussion of what Professor Mikhail Tsypkin calls a policy of tit-for-tat in 
relation to nuclear weapons in statecraft. Mikhail Tsypkin, “The End of the INF Treaty and the Future of 
Russian Military Posture” (draft, Naval Research Program, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 
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61 Eugene B. Rumer, Russian National Security and Foreign Policy in Transition, Report NO. MR-
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Putin, 1st ed., IISS Adelphi Series No. 390 (New York: Routledge, 2007).  
62 Rumer, Russian National Security, 17.  
 25 
statecraft of a U.S. and NATO preponderance in Eastern Europe would eventually 
collide.  
Rumer stated, “U.S. policymakers face the task of balancing the newly 
independent states' right to sovereignty against the need to restore order in a given region 
and the desire to sustain continuity in U.S.-Russian relations.”63 These were prophetic 
words, nearly three decades later, have lately been turned by the Kremlin and others with 
sympathy in the West against this statecraft in a very aggressive revisionism. Rumer 
rightly reminds us that so called “hybrid” tactics and strategies are, in fact, fully 
integrated with old fashioned tiers of armor, artillery, long-range aircraft, and missiles, 
which may have lost some of their shine with the passage of time; however, the West, the 
United States, and its allies are struggling to field them in sufficient quantities of such 
forces to assure deterrence in the Baltic, the Black Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, and 
elsewhere.64  
The hype about the episodic talks of Russian Chief of Defense Valery 
Gerasimov65 to the highest echelons of command and military science in Moscow and 
elsewhere assigns to his statements the kind of pathbreaking innovation and strategic 
energy of a latter-day Napoleon with a total concept of ideological fervor and military 
force and propaganda as well as subversion, coercion, subterfuge, fifth columnists, and 
others. Rumer notes, “Instead of a new doctrine, Gerasimov offers a strategy to 
implement the actual doctrine that has guided the actual doctrine that has guided Russian 
                                               
63 Rumer, Russian National Security, 31.  
64 Rumer, Russian National Security, 53.  
65 Among a wide literature, see McDermott, “Gerasimov Outlines Russian General Staff,” 1–4. 
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foreign and defense policies for over two decades: the Primakov doctrine.”66Rumer 
rightly sees that the Russian offensive more or less since 2007,67 if not earlier, to which 
Gerasimov has appeared to enshrine in a “doctrine,” is a kind of ideological-military 
revival grounded in a comprehensive idea of diplomatic revision to the geopolitical 
benefit of Russia at the expense of the U.S. and its allies. The orientation of Russia’s 
strategy under Putin stems from older ideas of statecraft that are combined with Soviet 
“military science” that is framed by analysis of the correlation of forces and integrates 
psychology and politics in the making of strategy.  
In Soviet practice, civilian control of the military remained a viable concept in 
which strategy in military science must proceed from its political foundations. Rumer 
correctly observed that the so-called Gerasimov doctrine could better be characterized as 
a codicil of the Primakov doctrine or statecraft forming a lodestar of Russian policy since 
the rupture with the West in 1999, if not earlier. This policy takes as its point of departure 
that the “unipolar” U.S. world order enshrined in then Undersecretary of Defense Paul 
Wolfowitz’s memo of the early 1990s.68 Russian statecraft from the late 1990s is a 
rejection of U.S. global power emphasizing a bid to revive Russian world power via a 
more indirect approach drawing upon the tools already referenced in this paper. A logical 
consequence of this policy is diplomatic, and otherwise, resistance to the revival of 
NATO and its Article X enlargement in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, as well as its 
roles and missions to build security. Russia’s policy remained quiescent until 2004. It 
then embarked on counter force after the Bucharest North Atlantic Council of 2006 in 
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which the Bush administration played a strong hand to the path of Article X membership 
with Ukraine and Georgia—the prelude then to the 2008 Georgian campaign.  
Rumer points out the following key facts about this revanchist foreign policy and 
its application to military power and forms of aggression that thrive in the so-called grey 
zone.69 So called hybrid war,70 that is, subterfuge with a special military forces and 
diplomatic and propaganda intimidation across the board of statecraft in many forms, the 
generalized threat of force with the distinct chance of a major shooting war or campaigns 
of conquest of the old stripe, and a strategic pressure on the rungs of escalation that puts 
the object on the defensive relies on significant military power across the spectrum of 
conflict, Rumer writes, is not the core of Russian foreign policy. That is, no general has 
shoved aside the civilian authority in the Kremlin and foreign ministry to dictate the 
highest reaches of policy as one of arms.71 Rather, there has unfolded over time a cunning 
and effective use of limited military power and violence of a somewhat low order to 
exact a maximum of political and psychological result. This unfolding has been amid 
some shocking episodes, which have had undue psychological effect on its intended 
victims.  
Here a certain amount of the mirror imaging by the U.S. side of strategic events 
and practices among ourselves is wrongly projected onto the opponent.72 Mirror imaging 
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is an old problem, whereby our side loses sight of truths that were once more prominent 
in strategic analysis that used to be at the core of U.S.-Russian strategy. U.S. strategy 
today lacks a thorough familiarity with the institutions, personalities, customs, and, 
especially, the method of thought and deed native to Russian statecraft and military 
organization.73  Russian shock and awe operations comprised of special operations, 
propaganda, and fifth columnists are instrumental tools to impose a strategic burden on 
NATO in the Baltics and in the Black Sea to advance Russian capabilities.  
While the element of surprise about Russian revanchism has been great since at 
least the Georgian war in 2008, but more so since the Crimean occupation in 2014, the 
slow and purposeful unfolding of the Primakov doctrine since the 1990s has been a chess 
player’s kind of gambit. It has unrolled with a deliberateness and deft hand that deserves 
great admiration from any student of diplomacy and war familiar with the record of these 
things in modern European history.74  
However, one has also to say, as Rumer wisely observes, that the Syrian operation 
in its scale and combat power could not hold a candle to U.S. and coalition operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan in their size and strength.75 The Syrian operation manifested limited 
goals, which, at the same time highlighted the limits of Russian military power and 
subterfuge and irregular combat in proxy warfare. Russian military strength and its 
gunmen, as well as long range projectiles shot from the inland seas of the Russian realm, 
                                                                                                                                            
study treats the problem of mirror imaging of U.S. maritime thought on the growth of the Soviet Navy in 
the period from the 1960s until the 1980s. 
73 Anyone familiar with security studies in the U.S. Defense Department as well as in scholarly 
strategic studies is aware of the dearth of young expertise on Russian affairs in the generation since the end 
of the Soviet Union.  
74 Gordon Craig and Alexander George, Force and Statecraft: The Diplomatic Revolution of Our Time, 
3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 43–51. 
75 Rumer, The Return of Global Russia, 15.  
 29 
could do no more (and perhaps far less) than the far greater military power of the United 
States and its coalition allies/partners to impose a welcome strategic result in Syria that fit 
the wishes of the Kremlin. Such force and statecraft, grounded in strong economy that 
can sustain such a great power offensive, lie beyond the reach of Putin’s Kremlin and its 
clique to rule the Middle East.  
With these facts in mind, one can ask whether the relative Russian success in 
great power struggle in 2019 argues in favor of a further conservative adherence to the 
measured policy, which has put the West of its backfoot with a series of measured blows? 
Or, as in times past, when fate smiles as it now does on the Kremlin, whether greater and 
more ambitious goals beckon because violence begets violence? One can also say that the 
kind of persons thrust forward by the Russian government as it is presently constituted, 
which Alexander Navalny76 and others describe in their corruption and violence, has 
joined with the political operative-soldiers of fortune who are always in search of further 
adventure and, of course, further booty. Will the very measured attention manifest in 
Putin’s Kremlin to the correlation of forces with a kind of chess players acumen reign or 
give way to the freebooter spirit?77 
One can sum up Rumer’s survey of Russian diplomacy and its military expression 
over the last twenty years and say that too many in the West mistake cause and effect.78 
In other words, they inflate the role of Marshall Gerasimov, perhaps because of his 
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telegenic looks correspond to anti-Russian prejudices in the West nourished over 
centuries of false caricatures of the Russian enemy. Whether it is a function of fate, or as 
a deliberate Russian decision to formulate a truly Eurasian grand strategy, this dates to 
1996–99. That was the moment when NATO enlargement took hold (1995–97) and 
reached its climax in the years 1999–2003 with first the NATO Kosovo operation and 
secondly with the onset of the Iraq campaign. This American statecraft with ever more 
waging of war has caused the greatest sense of rebuke and grievance in Moscow.  
This revisionism takes the view that Russia remains a great power and must re-
assert its role as a global power and suffer under a unipolar global order. The goal of such 
statecraft is a multipolar concert of great powers that must evolve into a 21st century 
version of a Metternich-Alexander and which is liable to the school of power politics 
practiced by Putin. The ultimate objective is to create an antidemocratic, state-capitalist, 
and mercantilist Beijing-Moscow world condominium in which Europe and the United 
States play a diminished role. The two revisionist Eurasian powers can build circles of 
strength in their classical spheres of influence and enable the full unfolding of their 
imperial ambition on the carcass of defunct other empires as in the past.79  
A more or less a Russian free hand in its sphere of influence is central to 
contemporary Kremlin statecraft and is also a truth of strategic geography derived from a 
sense of vulnerability joined with an over bearing zeal of ideology about Eurasian 
exceptionalism as a rejoinder to Western perfidy and decadence since 1991. This stab in 
the back, of course, is the post-1995 decision in Brussels by NATO to enlarge according 
to Article X of the Washington Treaty. NATO enlargement robbed Russia of its glacis 
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and its self-appointed role as guardian of Zwischeneuropa. The Zwischeneuropa is the 
hapless stretch of Europe between Germany and Russia that great powers have batted 
about and which habitually gives cause to world wars,80 as in the heyday of the Molotov 
Ribbentrop Pact in 1939 or the nearly forgotten statecraft in Teheran or Yalta in 1943–44. 
One possible outcome is to revive a Russian-Chinese accommodation featuring a 
Eurasian consolidation under their influence and direction.  
A salient characteristic of the strategic environment as envisioned in Moscow is 
an unceasing state of hostility, not unlike the Cold War, but, in a sense, it is more 
dangerous because the war on terror as well as the digital battlefield have further blurred 
the lines of crisis and conflict that creates the specter of escalation. Since the nature of 
conflict is underpinned by a continuous tension and must be seen as linked to Erich 
Ludendorff’s ideal of total war81 in which all actions must be seen as subterfuge, coercive 
diplomacy, and policy, strategy, and tactics fomenting those aspects of politics and 
psychology in war.  
At the same time, no one can forget that the political will at the helm of this 
aggression can also mobilize significant combat power in regular, conventional, and 
nuclear echelons of sufficient striking power (e.g., the Zapad exercise82). This makes a 
mockery of the defender’s order of battle and especially makes ridiculous the attempts by 
NATO and its partners to defend themselves against such grey zone intimidation.  
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Rumer’s analysis of the hierarchy of policy, strategy, and operations in mind 
allows the consideration of Russia’s area denial and anti access posture in a more 
informed light. This, in turn, suggests analysis of the phenomenon in terms of an inquiry 
into classical forms of warfare and even war at sea as a way to comprehend the Russian 
threat to the U.S. Navy. The central point of this section is that Russia’s aggressive 
statecraft and strategy are rooted in historical experiences over the preceding centuries 
that saw the state slowly conceptualize a vision of controlling Eurasia and becoming a 
global superpower.83  
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IV. FORMS OF OFFENSE AND DEFENSE 
Since the revival of great power competition became a dominant feature in U.S. 
strategy in 2016,84 a variety of normative strategic ideas have emerged suggesting a path 
to victory. For example, some suggestions include a strategy of minimal effort and cost 
that features cyber war; another Cold War; hybrid war; a new eastern front; a direct 
approach against an indirect approach and an indirect approach against an indirect 
approach in the grey zone and carried out by a few cunning hard men and a few more 
cunning women in a reprise of shock and awe.  
The Center for Naval Analysis senior scholar and general skeptic in the post-
Crimean eruption of strategic debate about Russia and the world, Michael Kofman, 
published an insightful article in June 2018 on strategy of raids and “international 
brigandry.”85 In it, Kofman spoofs his colleagues who have accumulated around the term 
hybrid war as the ultima ratio.86 One problem with this process, of course, derives from 
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the lack of familiarity from those in the foreign policy community that influence the 
making of Russian strategy.87  
One way of approaching Russia’s actions is to develop a theory of “raids” and 
“brigands” that present us with a normative concept of how the Kremlin wishes to wage a 
campaign of attrition rather than annihilation in great power struggle. Such a strategy also 
manifests the indirect approach88 versus the Jominian preference to mass overwhelming 
force at the decisive point (i.e., a strategy of annihilation).89  
Perhaps Kofman is prone to the military romanticism that has generally afflicted 
so many studies of contemporary warfare since the 9/11 attacks, where the colorful and 
myth laden figures of imperial warfare have their imitators in the ranks of special 
operation forces, who have sprung up to conduct counterinsurgency campaigns.90 These 
errors aside, however, he is more on the mark than many in his reference to the Russian 
past and to schools of strategy and combat that one finds there and elsewhere in Eurasia. 
He suggests that warfare and conflict in a U.S.-Russian great power competition is not 
hurtling forward through the so-called Gerasimov doctrine and various massed fires; 
instead, it can be thought of as form of brigandry. In classical military parlance, this is a 
form of small warfare or irregular combat that recalls the Middle Ages and the epoch 
prior to a modern centralized, bureaucratic state and a standing army.  
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When one keeps in mind Rumer’s analysis interpreted above and the critique of 
the purported Gerasimov doctrine, the Russian preference for raids is not surprising.91 
Grand strategy based on a raid on a grand or even minor scale serves the ends of the 
weaker (e.g., Russia in confrontation with U.S. and NATO forces and also Japan, South 
Korea, and other Western-oriented Asian allies) to achieve a strategic objective. On the 
other hand, Kofman argues that the native emphasis in the U.S. defense establishment on 
massive echelons of military and maritime power (even of massive echelons of cyber 
defense and cyber striking power) better enable the Russia’s classic indirect approach.92 
Kofman is right to suggest that the term “raids” has more to offer the young strategist on 
the U.S. or NATO side or on staffs of the pro-Western Indo-Pacific powers than the 
goosy term “hybrid war.” He writes,  
Raiding should not be confused with hybrid warfare. Raiding is an 
established historical approach to warfare, with discernible phasing, 
objectives, ways, and an overall strategy. The application of hybrid 
warfare to describe Russian operations has usually been confusing and 
disjointed in practice. Today, the term is increasingly relegated to 
European conversations about Russian information warfare and political 
chicanery.93 
This generalization is true because what today is characterized as a raid was in 
former times more or less described in classical military thought and even naval thought 
and practice as “little war” or “petty war.”94 That is, more or less operations and tactics in 
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which the decisive battle95 with large echelons of troops were not involved, and such 
combat was often executed by irregular units detached from the main body of an army.  
U.S. military doctrine today defines a raid as a tactic,96or at most a maneuver on 
the operational level, intended for the temporary seizure of a given territory for 
reconnaissance. The objective is to sew mayhem among enemy forces, to take prisoners, 
to capture weapons—or to destroy these things—and then withdraw in an organized 
manner. The United States today also views raids as a strategic tool. With the evolution 
of special operations out of the wreckage of Desert One in 1980 until today, U.S. special 
forces now effectively constitute a separate (and dominant) branch of the military, which 
has inflated the role of raids to strategic prominence.  
A search in what for most today is an incredibly distant past maybe gives more 
character and contour to this idea as put in hand by the Russian side than the citation of 
U.S. field manuals. Russia’s grasp of the importance of raids is grounded in its history. In 
17th and 18th century warfare, light cavalry or hussars were the echelon most suited to this 
set of tactics. Famous for their striking power and feared by their opponents were cavalry 
drawn from Croatians, Serbs, and Pandurs, while in Tsarist Russia, Cossacks, Kalmyks, 
and Bashkirs struck terror into the slowly maneuvering main line of opponent armies, 
such as the Prussians.  
Kofman reminds us that the Russians have long been at home in this form of 
combat97 from the beginnings of their history on the steppe against the Mongols and the 
Byzantine empire. Significantly enough, this strategy and tactics was manifest in the 
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Northern War98 in the early 18th century when Russia joined the ranks of the great 
powers at the expense of the Swedes and the Poles. The possibility for raids was also 
present in the first and second World Wars on the eastern front, which featured endurance 
of maneuver on a grand scale. One example of the latter having been the operation of the 
24th Armored Corps in connection with the relief of Stalingrad in late 1942.99  
Raiding in the maritime realm is as storied and the thing of legend as are 
marauding cavalry who put an enemy army to flight. Guerre de course and/or 
privateering was undertaken by maritime naval entrepreneur, who with letters of marque, 
would seize enemy shipping. From the rise of warfare at sea via modern navies in the 
early modern period until the middle of the 19th century, such privateering and the use of 
cruisers against enemy shipping inflicted heavy losses due to the inability of a defending 
power to secure all such shipping. Such a form of combat at sea was much visible in the 
U.S. Civil War, despite international law restricting such operations. This form of warfare 
at sea reemerged in the first World War initially with surface ships and later with the 
offensive use by the Germans of submarines.  
Kofman reminds us that Russian military doctrine today, as in former times, sees 
the center of gravity in the Clausewitzian categories in real war of the union of politics 
and psychology in the will of the opponent especially as this will manifests itself in a 
titanic struggle of ideology and statecraft in the geopolitical arena.100 This school of 
ideological and high tech revanche burdens the capacity of the opponent to formulate a 
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coherent strategy via a bloodless assault on the economy, structure of mass persuasion 
and domestic politics, and on the credibility and sovereignty of government in a general 
sense. With a nod to the Okhrana persons (tsarist secret police) who wrote the strategic 
fraud of the protocols by the Zion in the tsarist period elders, the Russian chief of defense 
has suggested an emphasis on the ideological and the tools of subterfuge and subversion 
to break the enemy’s will are four to one. In this vein, the notable statements of persons 
in uniform shift the point of decision in warfare to its storied “initial period,”101 with a 
kind dogmatism of “noncontact” warfare, with General Nikolai Ogarkov’s 
reconnaissance strike complexes again in play with the use of long range missiles of the 
one-shot-one-kill type, as well as a propaganda and subterfuge campaign to break the 
enemy’s will on a grand scale.  
With its generous quotes from the past,102 this amalgam of combat and subterfuge 
contains a synthesis of the conflicting tendencies of the general staff for warfare in its 
higher echelons of scale. It also contains ample forces linked with the post-modern 
emphasis on psychological warfare and the manner in which the digital realm has struck 
at the formation of the political in state and society. Moreover, it offers a way to deploy a 
Trojan horse with minimal bloodshed toward victory in a global battlefield in which there 
will be no front, no rear area, and no noncombatants. Through a kind of mixed first strike 
in its digital and raiding posture, the Russian military will exact a high enough toll that 
the opponent will retreat or yield. Trenchantly, Kofman sees here a coercive theory of 
victory of these stabbing thrusts rather than the annihilation on a massive scale (such as 
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the Battle for Berlin) or the posture to wage nuclear war against NATO in the 
confrontation of the late Cold War.103  
Echoing the shibboleth of Friedman’s globalization,104 Kofman suggests that the 
present world political and economic order, like the seaborne commerce of an earlier time 
and the global connections of economy and state that it fostered (i.e., the British empire), 
has enabled the enemies of the West to strike and pillage with greater alacrity than in the 
block confrontation of the Cold War. The manner in which globalization has opened 
borders and has fostered migration is on a scale unseen since the close of the second 
World War. 
The Russians, in imitation of their Chinese coalition partners, recently to have 
tried to break the Silicon Valley hegemonic internet. That is, to separate, say, a fairly 
raucous Russian civil society from its place in YouTube to counteract the stultification of 
Russian state television with its Kuban Cossack Choir inflected diatribes against the West 
or its Sputnik/Russia Today mass persuasion offensive in the West itself. Such a move 
signifies what, in its core, is an attempt to reestablish totalitarian control over the press 
and the public mind as is becoming the norm not only in Moscow. This has also b 
become manifest in places such as Istanbul, Warsaw, and Budapest; it has even showed 
in Vienna recently.105 The discussion of the much-prized digital cosmos aside, one has to 
note, as Kofman does, that contemporary conflict in the stricter military sense (be it in 
Europe, the Middle East, in Africa, and even in Latin America) allows the return of 
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chances for the Russians to mount a raid with more or less military and even naval 
forces.106 Kofman asserts that suggestions of the Donbass region in Ukraine is a kind of 
reprise of the eastern front (i.e., the cumbersome, and frankly foolish, term of “industrial 
warfare,”107 is a misimpression). He sees the operation there as a raid that has gone 
somewhat wrong. In his view, the fighting had the goal of shoving Ukraine back into the 
post-Soviet orbit and to exact such a high cost for a Euro-Atlantic orientation that 
Russian victory could be had on the cheap.108 In this school of strategic thought, then, the 
Russian small war or irregular operation in the Donbass, with its unending attritional 
character, seeks to cripple Ukraine and make it repugnant to those in Warsaw, Berlin, 
Brussels, and Washington who would transform the Ukraine into a vastly greater bulwark 
thrust close into the Russian heart as in a sense, the NATO Baltics have become in the 
north.  
The thesis of raiding as a normative explanation for perhaps the most striking part 
of the Russian assault on putative U.S. hegemony also contains contradictions and failure 
on a major scale. Kofman suggests that if the Russian side marshaled all its forces in 
totality, it could well crush the armed forces of Ukraine as an independent nation state,109 
since the initial coup de main has, in fact, spun out of control and devolved into a 
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protracted conflict of the type that Communists used to celebrate at length.110 This 
protracted quasi-frozen conflict includes sabotage of society and economy, political 
murder of opponents, as well as constant low-level small unit encounters with ongoing 
casualties. These ensure that the pressure remains on Kiev and the wounded and dead 
mount in number—but in such a way that the wider world becomes paralyzed to Kremlin 
aggression.  
Kofman then poses the key question: Will the success of Putin’s offensive against 
the West and the political chaos and paralysis that is manifest in Western capitals and 
elsewhere then present the authors of the grand plan (or the casino players of 
opportunism) with the golden horizon of further adventure and booty?111 When one adds 
the factors of chance in this strategy (with an eye to Clausewitz and with the character 
and intellect of the Russian leadership), will they calculate carefully? Or will they 
become prone to moments of self-delusion and catastrophic decision making wrought 
with escalation and the dynamic of the July crisis of 1914 in their future attempts to 
unravel the U.S. role in the world and, by implication, the posture of the U.S. Navy?  
Where will the Russians raid next? Will the opportunity to raid more at the 
perimeter lead more to adventurism? The threat of major war in the summer of 2019 is 
plain enough. The revived forward position of Russian power in Syria has returned 
Russia to a position of influence in the Middle East. Has this event undone how the 
Egyptians expelled the Soviets in 1972? Will this good fortune and center of power lure 
those nation states in the Middle East away from their orientation to the U.S./Western 
side? Or, conversely, will the episode of February 7, 2019, wherein the Wagner (Russian) 
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mercenaries at Deir Ezzor, Syria were apparently subject to 30 mm chain gunfire and 
flying artillery aboard special operations aircraft—as happened to the retreating Iraqi 
columns from Kuwait City in 1991—be sufficient deterrent to such raids in the future?  
The eclipse of U.S. power in the Middle East may convince its allies there to seek 
new strongmen amid a new hierarchy of great power competition. This brutal logic of 
power suggests that the Russians will maraud as they can against U.S. positions of 
strength, whether fading or not. Does the putative success of the Russian intervention in 
the Syrian fighting (exacted at a small cost in lives and treasure) in turn offer the Kremlin 
and its coalition in Damascus and Teheran (and, one assumes, Beijing), much benefit on 
the great power roulette table by more indirect forays (e.g., raids in various forms)?  
One possible outcome whereby U.S. maritime power is thwarted or hacked away, 
piece by piece, with a counterforce that deters an effective blow or imposes a great 
strategic cost to the U.S. Navy at a minimum cost to the Russian side. All the while, the 
brutal logic of a kind of science of conflict or dialectic of conflict in Putin’s mind, and the 
semi-Leninist minds of his officers, foresees the shift of power to Beijing over the long 
haul. This is a circumstance that would enable the Kremlin to maneuver Beijing to a new 
kind of Congress of Vienna in the 21st century, wherein the post-1989 order would be 
revised more to the statecraft seen by the allies at the middle of the second World War, a 
U.S. retreat from Eurasia, and the creation of spheres of influence in which great powers 
are enabled with a pleasing free hand.  
A sympathetic and nationalistic reading of Russian history as a great power, one 
that ignores Russian imperialism and a constant threat posed to its neighbors in the search 
for power, may furnish the dream in Kremlin minds that such raiding mounted over a 
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long period of time is worth the cost it might impose on peace and prosperity at home.112 
Despite Russia’s own weakness relative to the United States and the European Union, 
Japan, and other allies, the Indo-Pacific thrust in Washington to organize Asian powers to 
contain China with a broad front that is prone to break, as well as the inherent strengths 
of a Eurasianist China over time, may force Washington to abandon its position in 
Europe and the Middle East or somehow to reduce its structure of power there from 
which Moscow would benefit. Washington reducing its power structure would, of course, 
mean throwing the Baltics, the Poles, the Romanians, and so on back into the abyss 
where they long resided in the European order. From the theory of raids as stratagem of 
policy and military effort, this inquiry now turns to the fortress aspect, anti access, and 
area denial, of this study in detail.  
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V. THE RUSSIAN CONCEPT OF AREA DENIAL TACTICS, 
ORDER OF BATTLE, PROJECTILES AND THE STRATEGIC 
IMPLICATION OF ANTI ACCESS AND AREA DENIAL  
The foregoing has analyzed within the frame of foreign policy and strategy the 
more offense oriented concept whereby Russian forces, in the maritime realm, assume a 
posture of confrontation with maritime forces erode the global reach of the U.S. Navy in 
great power struggle.113 The study now turns to the central concept in its title, the 
strategic and operational effort at long- and longer-range to bar U.S. maritime forces 
from deploying to a theater of conflict, and, even if they do deploy, to make their 
operations improbable or impossible through constant barrage across the spectrum of 
combat so that this effort is deflected and defeated.  
In the ideal case, such defenses by incurring an ever greater cost on the U.S. Navy 
to revive operations, tactics, and weapons, which may have languished since the 1970s, 
enables the Russians to strike at the center of gravity of U.S. and allied will to defend, the 
desire to bear arms in conflict, and also to make U.S. maritime power appear illegitimate 
and damaged in the eyes of a critical world.114 The U.S. global maritime posture is 
subjected to an unrelenting pressure of confrontation short of fighting, per se, as a show 
of force. As mentioned, this force seeks to exploit whatever points of weakness emerge in 
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our maritime front, especially in its maritime aspect relative to collective defense in 
proximity to Russia itself, the forward deployment of naval forces in such contested 
waters in their growing number. This process resembles the pattern of maritime 
confrontation of the Cold War (interceptions and incidents at sea and in the air). 
However, it is on a smaller scale and in a new, more conflict laden environment of a hair 
trigger posture amid a general decline of diplomacy and the erosion of the arms control 
and multilateral contacts that ended the Cold War a generation ago. If one can compare, 
this present epoch is either without precedent, or it is akin to the shock and confusion of 
the early Cold War (1947–1962), within it the potential for escalation115 and accidental 
war on a larger scale, the strategic benefits of wearing down the fighting spirit at sea of 
the U.S. Navy on a global front.  
With the offense, of course, goes the defense; in a very real way, the defensive 
and/or defensive-offensive core of area denial and anti access speaks to the fortress part 
of the title of this paper. That is, Russia, like the United States, by dint of its geography in 
its continental and maritime character, Russia has a special record with fortress 
building.116 This story is not properly appreciated in the contemporary strategic debate. 
This debate is too infused of a special warfare view of all of combat that is skewed. Or 
this contemporary school of warfare places an overemphasis on the outsize impact of 
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small unit engagements in a level of warfare that rests at the lower range.117 It also 
emphasizes the ultimate weapon of digital technology, which forgets the role of 
fortifications in the record of war and in the essence of military organization. No such 
amnesia exists on the Russian side relative to fortifications.  
The relationship of offense to defense in war and in the posture of how armies, 
navies, and air forces are conceived, armed, and, in turn, fight in combat is a very 
rewarding aspect of the story of armed force. However, it, too, has been skewed much in 
official thinking and debate in the last twenty years. This skewing is in whatever 
direction away from major war has made the term of area denial and anti access more 
challenging for a new generation unfamiliar with anything other than what is actually a 
very low level of violence in a very strategically limited form of warfare. While the term 
of area denial and anti access was coined by a U.S. Navy strategist scholar, Sam 
Tangredi,118 more or less in reference to the Asian/Indo-Pacific theater of conflict, the 
term has become prominent as concerns the Russian revival great power conflict since 
2014 at the latest.  
The headlines found at the beginning of this study of events in June 2019119 as 
concerns Russian attempts at the interdiction of a U.S. Navy cruiser in the Philippine Sea, 
as well as the proliferation of missile bases of all kinds, along with the reconstruction of 
Soviet era bunkers amid the emplacement of new batteries of anti-aircraft and anti-ship 
missiles in their number, all point to an acronym that is made to be the catch all for the 
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impact of great power competition in its impact on maritime forces. The concept of anti 
access and area denial suffers in one aspect as being a kind of buzz word, which CNO 
Richardson was well to constrain.120 In the second aspect, this buzz word emphasizes a 
dogma of tactical and the technological determinist.121 The dogma says that war is merely 
a contest of competing weapons amid an unending arm’s race. This dogma ignores the 
imponderables of real war, as in Clausewitz (i.e., the role of chance, the effort by a few to 
impose some order to a coherent political purpose on war, which always is going out of 
control, and, finally, the fighting will of the people or state or whoever either to attack 
another or to resist attack).  
Since Russia is a place of imponderables once more, as it has been in the past, 
these factors over and above the merely tactical (versus operational and strategic) as well 
as the technological have become predominant. As important as technology surely is, 
other factors also operate as the record of war has suggested since September 11, but also 
since 1945, and in earlier periods.  
One can suggest that the all-purpose term anti access and area denial has been 
gaining popularity in the last decade first in relation to the Chinese threat to U.S. air and 
naval forces in the Pacific. After Crimea, the popularity of term has spread to the 
strategic jeopardy of the Baltics and Poland. The focus has shifted to the littoral of the 
Russian Federation amid its rearmament and revisionism more or less since 2007. The 
strategic, operational, and tactical expression of this idea is as simple as the story of 
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cannon mounted on a high land to prevent the entry into a harbor.122 In post-Crimea case, 
the range of weapons and their deployment has far greater heft, in other words, to prevent 
an opponent unimpeded and combat-free movement en masse or a theater of operation 
(i.e., anti access). Needless to say, this posture of defense, and of offensive-defense is as 
old as warfare itself. Moreover, the scope of this posture has grown with the increasing 
range of weapons of all kinds, beginning with modern artillery and other weapons on 
land and in the water, progressing to over the water, and then joined by missiles. The 
shorter-range defensive and offensive-defensive weapons in their number fall into the 
category of area denial. As in former times, when an advanced nation state more or less 
on the model of Europe, North America, and Japan mounted such defenses, they included 
an array of mutually supporting and overlapping weapons that left the attacker no safe 
ground (i.e., horizontal fire weapons of great range, and shorter range, plunging, indirect 
fire weapons, as well as mines, aircraft, and warships with shorter range to act in concert 
with such defenses on land with a maritime role).123  
In the 21st century, this principle operates in Russia as the culmination of a long 
record of effort, especially in naval forces in a posture unfamiliar,124 say, to the United 
States, but not to continental Europe. This is to say, land-based defenses (e.g., missiles, 
aircraft) arrayed against a hostile fleet that rested in the hands of the sea services. Both 
Russia and Germany embraced this order of battle, which is utterly foreign to the 
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thinking and deeds of a U.S. Navy officer today. In fact, in the past Russian coastal 
defenses in their classical posture have been well outside of the U.S. Navy ’s 
organization. For instance, Russia has marine armored infantry and coast artillery for 
maritime defense (the United States uses Marines for over the shore offense), naval long-
range aviation, and other maritime echelons that are not included in the order of battle of 
the present-day U.S. Navy. In other words, the Russian navy in its organization, doctrine, 
and force structure does not imitate the strategy, doctrine, and organization of a NATO 
force. 
In order to defeat an opponent, the Russians have deployed an entire range of 
missiles in a defensive and offensive posture as they have in the past. These projectiles 
include anti-aircraft and anti-missile surface to air types of every greater range and 
striking power, together with anti-vessel ballistic rockets, together with cruise missiles 
directed against naval vessels. These weapons are supplemented, as in times past, with 
mines and with drones in the spotting role. They are further augmented in depth, say, in 
the Baltic and Black Sea, by their deployment along with the aerospace and ground 
forces in number, regular army units equipped with the ever present ballistic, and cruise 
missile of newer and older make, as well as the omnipresent long-range tube and rocket 
artillery so central to Russian land forces.  
This array of forces either prevents the initial deployment on the operational or 
tactical level of hostile forces or imposes such a burden of constant barrages of such 
weight as to break the will and scatter these, as one has seen in the past five years, in the 
Georgian, Donbass, and Syrian campaigns for instance.125 While the mass persuasion 
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propaganda connected to this strategy from the Russian side has endeavored since Crimea 
in 2014 to give the impression of being impenetrable and invulnerable. The record of war 
at sea and in interaction with coastal defense is a mixed one. The annals of combat in 
modern history contain many examples of such defenses126 being overcome by naval 
force and otherwise in horrendous battle or maneuver. This issue is explored below in the 
Scandinavian critique of the anti access and area denial concept.127 Since the RAND 
study in 2016128 concerning the vulnerability of the three Baltic NATO members, has 
gained such attention relative to the Blitzkrieg paradigm of Russian operations and the 
curse of geography in northern Europe, the anti access and area denial concept in 
maritime strategy has also drawn ever more attention. Emphasis to the tactical and 
weapons technology facets of this phenomenon versus an emphasis on strategy in general 
is misplaced.  
While the trends here have strategic implications for Russian maritime forces in 
the Eurasian theater and beyond, the selection of one particular area has merit, even if 
this case study may obscure special characteristics of strategy, operations, and tactics in 
other theaters. The process of anti access is most visible then in the case study in the 
Baltic,129 where the remnants of the German Reich under Russian control in the province 
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of Kaliningrad not surprisingly emerged as a center of conflict and a manifestation of this 
strategy and force posture.  
It is not surprising that interest in this form of warfare and force posture, 
especially, grew as the transformation of the former east Prussian enclave of Kaliningrad 
unfolded from its role in the 1990s as a Baltic “Hong Kong” or even a Hansa town 
version of a care free Monte Carlo.130 All too swiftly this region became engulfed in the 
unhappy clouds of war in the new century and the revival of war amid great power 
conflict in an area well familiar with this sad aspect of global life. As the entente between 
Russia and the European Union and the United States faded at the end of the 1990s, and 
then collapsed in the years thereafter, Kaliningrad underwent the process of rearmament 
that presently shocked admiralties in Washington, Brussels, and London.  
This paper hardly offers adequate space to analyze the Baltic as a theater of 
war.131 As of 2016, the effort by the Russian military to render the former east Prussian 
province, such as it has endured in its odd political geography since 1991, into a forward 
bastion of revived power was overwhelming.132 The province had by 2016 become the 
base of such maneuver formations as the 336th Guards Marine Brigade133 under the 
command of the Baltic Fleet. This unit was backed up by the 79th Guards Motorized Rifle 
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Brigade134 and the 7th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment under the territorial headquarters of 
the Western Military District in Petersburg.135 True to practice in the Soviet period, these 
ground forces with a maritime focus are complemented, in turn, but a large air echelon in 
the frame of the Baltic Fleet. In 2016, this order of battle included the 689th Independent 
Fighter Aviation Regiment at Chkalovsk, equipped with Sukhoi 27 Flanker air superiority 
fighter with maritime service, as well as the 4th Independent Naval Assault Aviation 
Regiment at Chernyakovsk, with the Su 24 Fencer attack aircraft. At the same base, was 
located the 152nd Guards Missile Brigade, which enables the fortified province once more 
to subject Russia’s neighbors to a barrage of missiles of the type not seen for a 
generation. In 2016, this unit boasted Tochka-U (i.e., the NATO SS-21 Scarab short-
range missiles squadrons)136 and Tochka-M (i.e., the SS-21 Scarab). These missiles are 
deployed in two squadrons with three batteries comprising 12 missile carrier/launchers in 
total. One assumes that these obsolete Soviet rockets will be supplanted and replaced by 
the newer Iskander-M surface to surface rocket,137 the combat power of which has plainly 
eclipsed the earlier weapon from the 1970s. These rocket forces are backed up by 
conventional artillery of great range and power, in classical Russian practice, which gives 
such pride of place to artillery. The 244th Artillery Brigade is also stationed with 2A36 
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Hyacinth B-caliber 152 mm138 with a range of up to 33 km, and it was used in former 
times to fire nuclear projectiles in the classical pattern.  
While the above maneuver echelons, air sea forces, and rocket and tube artillery 
are formidable enough, the main punch in terms of area denial rests, in turn, with the 3rd 
Aerospace Defense Brigade139 also in Kaliningrad. This contingent bristles with two 
aerospace defense regiments, the 183th and the 1545th, equipped with the legendary S-
300140 in its newest versions. In the course of 2016, one of these units was upgraded to 
the S-400 Triumf141 (NATO SA 21 Growler) and thus enable Russian forces in their 
Baltic bulwark to strike eastward. This would thereby effectively thwart or defeat NATO 
air defense of a significant part of the Baltic NATO states as well as Poland. This is to 
say nothing of the knock-on effect for air defense and operations of the armed forces of 
Sweden and Finland, which have made no secret since 2014 of their growing alignment 
with NATO in the Nordic realm. As if this order of battle were not cause for sufficient 
concern, Kaliningrad has the 22nd Independent Air Defense Regiment, armed with the 
Tor M1 weapon system, which is known in NATO parlance as SA-15 Gauntlet. This 
surface to air missile is also deployed in naval service as the 3K95 Kinzhal, which has the 
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NATO designation SA-N-9 Gauntlet. A product of the 1980s Cold War, the Soviets 
forged Tor as the first air defense system to defeat the precision guided cruise missiles of 
the 1980s (i.e., the once dead and now alive AGM 86) and to shoot such projectiles out of 
the sky in all weather, at times of day, and to defeat electronic warfare countermeasures. 
To guide these air defense weapons is the Voronezh-M early warning radar, which is said 
to have a range of 6,000 kilometers (kms). Further combat units in this posture comprise 
the 25th Coastal Air Defense Regiment at Baltiijsk,142 which, in 2016, had some three 
batteries of mobile missiles including the venerable P35 Redut surface to surface missile 
to be directed against warships and sporting a range of 250 kms.  
This maritime and aerospace order of battle in Kaliningrad raises the general 
question of the posture and composition of forces for anti access and area denial on the 
full horizon of Russian maritime effort against NATO and Western allies.143 Is the case 
of the Baltic unique because of its geographical role and its proximity to the number two 
conurbation in Russia (i.e., Petersburg), or is it to be generalized on a global posture, as 
suggested by the title of this study? These defenses have been a central feature of the 
Russian military buildup of the past decade and more in a span from the Arctic (itself 
rightfully a theme of a separate paper) southward into the old and new zone of power in 
Syria and now to Turkey, via foreign military sales. In addition to the northern flank in 
the Baltic, most significant for this paper is the southern flank in the Black Sea, with the 
swift fortification of Crimea, which is analyzed below. We are witness to the re-
establishment of defenses with an operationally offensive posture and their expansion due 
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to the increased capabilities of weapons that represent an evolutionary design of older 
missiles, aircraft, and vessels. This process has the strategic effect of imposing such a 
high price on NATO or other pro-Western maritime allies that, in case of scenarios of 
Russian subterfuge and limited aggression in the Baltic,144 a forward defense of allies and 
partners in crisis and war could be rendered moot. The danger here is a coup de main on a 
scale greater, say, than in Crimea in 2014 or Syria in 2015, but below the level of what in 
former times was called general war, including the use of nuclear weapons. This posture 
is dangerous because of its tendency to destabilize deterrence and to drive conflicting 
parties toward the fatal logic of a first strike with nuclear weapons.  
The size of air, sea, and land combatant forces has so radically shrunk since the 
1980s, and the prospects of reviving forces of similar size is hardly practical (nor, in the 
view of some, a strategic and operational necessity). Given these facts, the customary 
U.S. and NATO aerospace superiority145 has become the focus of Russian defenses, a 
thing they are well able to mount. The Russian side well sees that the main thrust of the 
U.S. style post-Cold War operations in the offensive has unfolded in the episodes the 
1990–1991 campaign in Kuwait, the 1999 campaign in Kosovo, to say nothing of the 
2002–2003 campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. This strategy may or may not have 
reached a point of diminishing return in the face of a well-organized and well-equipped 
defenses wielded by a hostile great power able to use high technology weapons against 
United States and its allies.  
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In this way, the Russian military thought and its application in doctrine seeks to 
shift the initiative to a combination of the offensive via subterfuge and psychological 
warfare joined with a limited use of military force, and the threat of an operational 
defensive that exacts a high price on the limited numbers of hostile forces employed for 
enhanced forward presence or for follow on forces. The growing capabilities of Russian 
aerospace and maritime defensive weapons, projectiles that are in the year 2019 in the 
news on nearly a daily basis as a manifestation of a psychological warfare offensive 
linked with this strategic and operational defensive in force posture and weapons.146  
In particular, as concerns anti-aircraft and aerospace material, Russian thinking 
sees these priorities based on the advances of U.S. and allied air power and combat 
operations in the past generation. Anti-aircraft sensors and weapons must boast:  
1. A very strong immunity to electronic warfare jamming in intensive electronic 
countermeasures environment;  
2. High survivability in massive employment of high-speed anti-radiation missile-
type antiradar missiles;  
3. The power to destroy swiftly such high precision weapons as the Tomahawk 
cruise missile, Walleye 2 guided air bomb, and the Maverick guided missile;  
4. Combat power to defeat fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, great numbers of 
remotely piloted vehicles intended to overwhelm such active and passive 
air/aerospace defenses (such combat power and technical effectiveness must 
be all weather and night and day in a variety of global climates);  
5. The various vehicles and weapons must be highly mobile at speed and also, when 
appropriate, provide air defenses for advancing motorized and armor units;  
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6. These weapons and vehicles must follow the Russian custom of combat 
robustness and of such endurance as reliably to fight under the most adverse 
conditions of service.147  
It hardly needs mentioning that the sale of Russian of S-400 aerospace flak 
missile systems to Turkey checks off the blocks of this strategic, operational, and tactical 
suite of area denial and anti access thrust, especially without a shot being fired. As was 
the case in the cases of the 1950s until the early 1960s,148 and, say, in the final stages of 
the classic Cold War in the late 1970s until the mid-1980s, the strategic political utility of 
missiles is paramount—quite aside from their operational effectiveness in actual wartime 
in a mid- to high-intensity war. The Russians view such weapons as a tool of a military-
economic diplomacy, which builds an anti U.S. geopolitical order on the raiding principle 
and also sustains the effective operation of the Russian military industrial complex.149 
The most famous are the Russian surface to air missiles,150 tactical surface to surface 
missiles, which have an operational and strategic effect because of the correlation of 
forces, coastal defense surface to surface, and coastal defense and surface to air missiles.  
These aerospace defenses plainly have strategic effect across the board from 
coercive diplomacy (malign measures) to deterrence in crisis and likely to operations in 
actual combat in mid- or high-intensity war. The weapons in the headlines today are the 
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legacy151 of the depth and breadth of Soviet development and deployment of such forces 
against the U.S. and NATO in the classic period of the Cold War.152 The Soviet Union 
had a majestic fleet of war planes suited to all combat roles, though their long range 
bombers were perhaps not as numerous or as effective as those in the West. Not only that, 
but the USSR also did all in its power to shoot U.S. aircraft and NATO aircraft out of the 
sky with other aircraft and missiles. In contrast, air defenses in the United States faded 
from strategic focus after the height of the Cold War, in the 1960s;153 such could never be 
said for the Soviet Union.  
For instance, the Soviet forces had engineering schools devoted solely to the 
challenges of air defense weapons of long- and short-range. These were headed by A. A. 
Raspletin and V. P. Yefromov. Those accustomed to the small armed forces of the 21st 
century can marvel at the order of battle of the Soviet military and even of its Warsaw 
Pact allies, which boasted air defense units in a size that seems unfathomable today. This 
does much to explain the return to this form of warfare and military and maritime 
operations in the 21st century.  
As the Kaliningrad order of battle illustrates, the heart of this old/new Russian 
aerospace arsenal is the following suite of flak rockets organized under the S-300 and S-
400 aerospace weapons systems. These generations of missiles are characterized as a 
family of weapons, including the ground to air S-300P and S-300V, as well as a sea borne 
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S-300 Fort missiles. These rockets were developed by the weapons firm of NP-Almaz 
within the recently founded firm of Almaz-Antey.154 As is the case in the present, such 
weapons were mobile to enhance their endurance in combat and to baffle the attacker 
versus fixed batteries. The S-400 (also known as the S-300PMU3 or NATO SA 21 
Growler)155 has evolved out of the S-300 suite of missiles, originating in 1993. In 
particular, the S-400 missile system has large mobile launchers of the type 5P85T2, 
joined with an air defense-target acquisition radar 96L6, which is linked with the 92N6 
Grave Stone engagement radar. The fight is brought to the hostile aircraft or missile by 
the single-stage 9M96 and 9M94D interceptor rocket. The range of these weapons has 
grown over time, such that what twenty or so years ago had earlier been a striking 
distance of 40 to 120 kms may have grown to 400 kms. This range of present missiles 
then has an operational strategic result versus the earlier tactical impact of the older 
weapons. Such an S-300 or S-400 battery does have 72 missiles at the ready, according to 
2016 Polish sources.156 These can be hurled at between 24 and 36 targets—in volleys of 
two rockets per target.  
Hence, seizing on the storied order of battle and tactics of Soviet designed air 
defenses157 over Hanoi and Haiphong in North Vietnam a half century ago, for example, 
the S-400 embodies in a single system comprised of a multitiered defense across a span 
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of medium- to long- and, now, very long-range. This result arises through the three types 
of missiles described above. These include the medium-range air defense described above 
with a range of up to 120 kms; the 9M96ME missiles arrayed in four tubes per launcher. 
Such missiles are more deadly in combat because they follow the hit-to-kill principle 
instead creating an area explosion. The heart of U.S. and NATO anxiety about this new 
air defense weapon system derives from a dual threat of lethality to fighting forces, which 
for a generation had been essentially free to fly and fight without noteworthy resistance 
from opponents with modest technical know-how or limited striking power. Firstly, the 
long-range defense missile with a range of 120–240 kms is embodied in the 48N6E3 
missile that can be employed against aircraft and missiles, like the U.S. Patriot. Secondly, 
the so called extra long-range missile is the 40N6E, which does or does not have a range 
of 400 kms against aircraft and missiles. Russian sources assert, such range and striking 
power, is without parallel and enables the defense to achieve once more an offensive 
strategic posture in both deterrence and actual combat. Such arises from the threat posed 
not only to aircraft and missiles on the attack closer to the respective tactical and 
command and control targets. The S-400 can strike at ballistic missiles, drones, airborne 
command and control, as well as electronic warfare aircraft across the sky in much 
greater range of the aerospace battleground. It can also strike also a variety of air 
command and control platforms on which present day U.S. and NATO air operations 
rely. 
Today, such weapons are pouring off the production lines of the state rocket 
factories of Putin’s revanchist Russia to fill the new and old ramparts (i.e., anti access 
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anti denial “bubbles”) in the Baltic and the Black Seas.158 Most important, to sustain the 
viability of these plants, to make a profit, and also to serve the ends of a statecraft with a 
long lineage of such weapons.159 Russia is arming Moscow’s clients as in Syria, and, 
especially, friendly armed forces. This process is an important part of the brutal calculus 
of great power conflict, but it is hardly a new thing at all. As these weapons roll off the 
production lines, they march into the dream world of Russian mass persuasion and the 
intimidation of the West.160 These weapons appear each day in social media, if not in the 
satellite images of U.S. and Western national technical media, as part of a drum beat of 
propaganda about weapons and the strong men and women who wield them. Such an 
order of battle and its mass persuasion represent the culmination of a rearmaments 
program that was embarked upon a decade ago. For instance, in 2010, once Putin had 
announced his revision of the Russian role in the global order, and the Georgian 
campaign heralded the return of Russian military power as a sign that the post-1990 
security order was at threat.  
In the 2010, weapons program had predicted that by next year fully 28 regiments 
of S-400 weapon systems would be in service. As recently, as 2015 some nine to eleven 
regiments had come into service. As if this order of battle is not enough, the men and 
women who forged these weapons promise a new model, the S-500 Triumfator M, which, 
according to Polish sources of three years ago, is supposed to already have 100 launchers 
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in place in the year to come. These new units are supplemented, of course, in depth and 
breadth by a formidable force thirty flak regiments armed with older anti-air weapons, 
among them are the S-300PS systems (in NATO, the SA-10 Grumble) and S-300PM (in 
NATO, the SA-20 Gargoyle).  
Following the principle of multiple weapons to make all altitudes and angles of 
attack more than lethal,161 the S-400 batteries are themselves defended against attack at 
close range by so called Pantsir S1/ SA 22 Greyhound rapid fire short-range flak 
batteries162 equipped with missiles and cannon to defeat close threats. Not for nothing are 
these frightening weapons named Carapace, as with their bristling missiles and cannon, 
they more resemble the fighting machines seen in science fiction films. Since the Russian 
forces possess a hypertrophy of air defense weapons, a wide arsenal of missiles and 
cannon can be employed to protect the operational striking power of the S-400. The 
further variants of the S-300 can reinforce the S-400 to offer further, in-depth defense 
against aircraft, short- and medium-range missiles, as well as independently targeted 
missile warheads. For instance, the S-300V4 can be reinforced with the infamous 
BukM2E medium-range surface to air missile. Such weapons are to be used not only 
against missiles and aircraft but against warships.  
A key aspect as in the area denial and anti access posture, order of battle, and 
tactics rests in the mostly forgotten Soviet Navy concept of bastions,163 a thing not 
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present in the U.S. Navy Mahanian idea of offensive sea power. These bastions were 
constituted in coastal defense practice of a shield in multiple dimensions of a home fleet 
centered around Soviet ballistic missile submarines postured as a second strike nuclear 
reserve. This reserve was to be made invulnerable to a U.S.-NATO assault, and their 
defensive power provokes an assault by the U.S. side that would result in unacceptable 
losses.  
In this vein, such weapons exist today as heirs to this strategy and operations of 
maritime bastions, a combination of land-based weapons and aircraft, as well as warships 
with defensive and offensive striking power. Of these missiles, one should note the K-
300P Bastion-P (in NATO, the SS-C-5 Stooge).164 This weapon entered the force in the 
year in 2010 as a mobile coastal defense system built by the firm NPO 
Mashinostroenia.165 As such, the missile is wielded against capital ships and other 
warships descending on the defender’s coast. A missile batter includes vehicles for the 
unit command and control, five supply and missile handling vehicles, and four launch 
carriers manned by three troops with four tubes each. Mobile in accordance with Russian 
doctrine of great lineage, the rocket launcher trucks can be as much as 25 kms from the 
command group. These rocket crews can fire their weapons within five minutes of the 
halt from the march. These missiles are the supersonic P-800 Oniks/Jachont (in NATO, 
the SS-N-26 Strobile)166 with a speed of Mach 2.5 and able to hurl a 250 kilogram 
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payload against warships over some 120 to 300kms. The weapon can as easily be used 
against land targets, with versatility that can only draw admiration.  
As if this defensive power of air defense missiles with their offensive potential 
was not enough, the Russians have notably not rested in the perfection of short- and 
medium-range surface to surface missiles, including weapons that violate the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty. This topic explodes the theme of this 
paper,167 but it has merit to its purpose all the same. Crucial to the strategic impact of the 
rearmament of Kaliningrad, the Black Sea, and likely beyond, is the potential to use 
offensive striking power to endanger a large section of Europe, but especially in the cases 
of the Baltic, the Black Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, and elsewhere. This offensive 
power can possibly restore the intermediate-range Russian missile dominance that formed 
such a powerful feature of the Cold War.  
This fact leads the analyst to the element of anti access and area denial 
symbolized by the operational striking power of the surface to surface missile, the 
Iskander-M or SS-26 Stone tactical missile weapon system.168 This weapon transforms 
the question of missiles/artillery complexes as part of a fortification system to prevent 
enemy forces from the conquest of territory on the tactical operational level to a question 
of offensive striking power by Russian missiles. This first became an issue in Europe or 
elsewhere in the near abroad of Putin’s Russia. 
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While not quite as much in the public imagination and mass persuasion on the 
Russian side in 2019 as the S-400 flak rockets, the Iskander (or SS-26 Stone) is a worthy 
second place in the specter of Russian missiles that constitute so much of the struggle in 
great powers between peace and crisis. This missile is the product of the storied 
Machinery Design Bureau, 169  which constructed such other tactical rockets as the 
Tochka-U and the Oka (intermediate range missiles). The INF treaty proved such an 
irritant to the United States that in 1987, Washington insisted on the destruction of these 
older weapons as part of the intermediate forces treaty, even these rockets were of a 
different character and traits from the much feared SS-20. In reality, the Iskander-M 
weapon system boasts two separate missiles of different power and configuration: the 
9M723 ballistic missile and the 9728 cruise missile. Russian sources assert that these 
weapons can fly no farther than 500 kms.  
The key advantage of the Iskander-M is its ability to penetrate non-strategic 
missile defenses. Its 9M723 ballistic missiles can be equipped with nuclear, high 
explosive fragmentation, and cluster warheads. It offers excellent accuracy, as well as the 
ability to penetrate Western non-strategic missile defense measures.  
This striking power has caused deep dread in Western capitals and offers a source 
of pride to Putin’s generals and admirals. Russian sources suggest that prior to the 
Ukraine incident, the Russian general staff had not intended swiftly to deploy the 
Iskander system to the Kaliningrad enclave, due to the escalatory potential of such an act. 
This locale deep into what is now NATO Europe enables the Russians not only to strike 
at the whole of Poland, but also to reach targets in Germany. Since the withdrawal of the 
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United States from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the deployment of U.S. anti-
missile systems in the Black Sea region, the Russian side has taken the step of the 
Iskander deployment as the kind of tit-for-tat policy analyzed by Tsypkin.170 The Russian 
defense correspondents quote the U.S. journal the National Interest, which is likely a 
mouth piece for the Defense Intelligence Agency, to the effect that Iskander is the most 
lethal Russian tactical surface to surface missile well suited for non-nuclear roles. This 
weapon can be supplemented, in turn, by longer range missiles that can swiftly break 
Western missile defense and wreak horrid damage on the NATO rear area. This NATO 
communication zone (rear area) into strategic prominence with the strictures of enhanced 
forward presence and the need to reinforce the Baltics and Poland as well as the Black 
Sea allies. A major assault of Iskander missiles would equal or surpass the power of a 
possible NATO opening assault to shatter Russian defenses in war time, the subject of 
this paper. So powerful in the Russian mind is the operational offensive power of 
Iskander, especially with its capacity to strike at will from the exclave well into the heart 
of the NATO rear, that Russia would enjoy a strategic advantage in the opening phases of 
war. Moreover, Russia could achieve operational victory with the anti access and area 
denial operational concept.  
The Russian side takes pleasure in registering the shock and awe among Western 
defense observers as to how swiftly in the last five years of crisis Putin’s revamped 
armed forces has bolstered Russian defenses in an offensive operational and strategic 
posture not only in the Baltic, but in the Black Sea, in the Middle East, in the Artic, and 
in the Pacific. This would be with a large force structure of the weapons and fighting 
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formations interpreted above. The Russian side well asserts, for example, that the 
fortification and transformation into a forward extension of the imperial fortress of 
Kronstad as unfolded in the Kaliningrad region signified nothing more and nothing less 
than a predictable response by the Russian side to the advent of U.S. anti-missile systems 
in the central European theater, even if their purported role was against Iran. Still greater 
was the shock by the swift strokes that unfolded over Crimea and out into the Black Sea, 
which, in the period prior, had luxuriated in the sunshine of NATO enlargement and the 
hostility to Moscow of the regimes in Kiev and T’blisi. The Russians quickly dispatched 
the full array of defensive/offensive weapons (i.e., the S-400, the S-300V4, the Iskander-
M, and the Bastion-P missile/artillery systems) to the exclave in Russian controlled Syria, 
where such defenses could enforce a no-fly zone over the Russian airbase in Khmeimim 
and its naval station in Tartus. In September 2018, Syrian anti-aircraft fire accidently shot 
down a Russian Il-20 command and control aircraft in the eastern Mediterranean. In 
response, the Russian high command strengthened these formidable air defenses with an 
automated command and control system with the most recent electronic warfare outposts. 
These defenses completed the bubbleization of the Russian exclave in Syria with 
whatever strategic implications for Israel and beyond. Here is the strategic reality of the 
school of area denial and anti access on the highest level of conflict: to inflict great cost 
on Western powers whose unfettered use of the aerospace domain of war since 1991 has 
been a ground truth of policy and strategy. This ground truth has crumbled in the 
mounting armament and blow and counterblow that are once again the norm of great 
power conflict. 
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VI. CONCLUSION: KEY THOUGHTS—STRATEGIC 
INTERDICTION AND SURPRISE  
This study has suggested that the sum of tactics and weapons employed for use at 
the operational and strategic level enables the Russian Federation under Vladimir Putin to 
challenge the freedom of maneuver of United States and allied forces in the waters 
adjacent to Russia on a global scale. This result poses significant operational burdens to 
Russia’s naval opponents to Moscow’s strategic benefit. Today’s Russian maritime 
forces draw upon an array of defensive and offensive weapons, some of which pose a 
significant surprise to those militaries unfamiliar with these armaments. As was the case 
at the end of the Cold War, Russia remains unable to field a fleet on a global scale. 
However, Russia’s capacity to thwart and complicate the unimpeded operation of U.S. 
naval forces along its Eurasian borders cannot be underestimated. This phenomenon 
presents US planners with serious problems in today’s epoch of great power competition.  
Certain fundamental truths of war and power underpin Russia’s maritime strategy. 
First, Russia’s anti access/area denial comprised of layered offensive and defensive 
weapons in a mutually supported posture is a force to be reckoned with at the strategic 
level of war.  Second, the layered approach is being buttressed by a new generation of 
capable weapons such as new and highly destructive cruise missiles and or hypersonic 
cruises missiles.  Importantly, these weapons can be fired from submarines the against 
the most vital targets in the continental United States, to say nothing of U.S. overseas 
bases and forward posts and places—a theme for additional study.  
In this strategic offensive, the question arises of whether Russia, with an economy 
the size of Italy in relative scale and dependent on the production of oil for its wealth, can 
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sustain its geopolitical offensive in a systemic way to compromise the operational 
freedom of U.S. and allied maritime forces. For the purposes of this paper, the Russians 
seem capable of drawing upon this strategy to indeed impose an exceptional burden on 
the U.S. Navy.  Should current trends continue, Russia has the capacity of complicating 
the application of US naval power for a generation if not longer. One sees here the use of 
the defensive as the stronger form of warfare in collision with the imperative in the U.S. 
Navy to strike an offensive blow to secure a strategic geopolitical end.  
For example, private, military contractors in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin 
America enable Russia to secure strategic benefit at the expense of the United States, 
encumber the free operations of the U.S. Navy, and impose great cost on U.S. allies and 
partners. This is, of course, helps undermine the idea that the U.S. is the dominant world 
power. These contractor groups generate their own profits to be sure, as in times past, and 
some of these can eventually join Moscow’s kleptocratic gunmen system of statecraft, an 
extension of structures and practices that operate at home. Russia perhaps correctly  
believes that the United States is disinclined to undertake significant countermeasures 
against this form of “grey zone” irregular warfare and subterfuge. This type of friction is 
not new, but reflects  earlier epochs of imperial competition in a pre-war setting of 
enduring tension.  
A. U.S. NAVY AND GEOPOLITICS IN GREAT POWER RIVALRY 
The U.S. Navy has assured America’s geopolitical supremacy since the end of the 
second World War. Now, after nineteen years of inconclusive irregular wars, the U.S. 
Navy is poised to return to a more central role in U.S. grand strategy. During the last 
nineteen years of U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, China and Russia 
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have built their strength, tailoring their military capabilities to challenge America’s 
ascendant global position. This challenge comprises an array of policies and new military 
capabilities that threaten the U.S. Navy’s maritime dominance. Responding to Russia’s 
challenge is of central importance to both the U.S. Navy and American grand strategy.  
In his 2007 Munich address, Putin announced that Russia would revolt against the 
U.S.-led global order. Following wars with Georgia (2008), eastern Ukraine (2014), and 
effective intervention in Syria (2015–2016), Putin has made good on that promise by 
backing up his words to reposition Russia as an influential global power. Today, Putin’s 
Russia is pursuing a strategy of systematically exploiting the growing weaknesses of the 
Western democracies with a full range of operations and tactics in various domains of 
warfare, both old and new. This report has sought to underscore how traditional domains 
of war remain decisive, in fact, perhaps, more decisive than such new realms of war as 
preoccupy an entity that uses technological “offsets” to master what are really 
fundamentally strategic problems of the customary variety—as looms large in great 
power rivalry.  
In the maritime domain, Russia’s threat comes from psychological/irregular 
warfare in critical theaters and as an actual operational threat to forward operations by 
U.S. and allied naval forces. Putin’s policy of revanche and restoration of former power 
is meant to thwart the United States and its allies and to seek revenge for those who have 
felt wronged since 1989 by the diplomacy and strategy of the past generation. One can 
say that Russia cannot pursue this aggressive agenda from a position of geopolitical 
strength as in 1948 or in 1979, which can well make it an even more dangerous adversary 
now than in former times. Rather, Putin’s revanchist policy and strategy face the sharp 
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limits of diminishing national power (associated with limited resources that empower the 
sustainable employment of levers), which is, itself, inherently unstable and dangerous. 
The Russian offensive has already struck at the weaknesses engendered by over 
extension, political chaos, and inattention of Western powers to the system of the great 
powers. 
No less important is Russia’s return to its old Soviet realms in the Middle East 
and beyond, as this offensive has direct impact on U.S. influence in the Mediterranean 
and Arabian Gulf. Moreover, Russia has developed a missile and precision strike 
complex designed to challenge America’s military advantages resident in aerospace 
warfare, thus Russia has potential to threaten U.S. and allied unfettered maritime access 
to these areas. In the aftermath of the broken INF Treaty, new Russian maritime weapons 
include hypersonic, long-range missiles to threaten continental United States and 
European areas of critical maritime importance.  
Russia’s attempt to control the Ukraine and its dominant position in the Black Sea 
are not only a direct challenge to the U.S. maritime power and Western maritime norms, 
but they also provide Russia a secure base to project power into the Mediterranean. Thus, 
Russia defines itself as an indispensable global power. Furthermore, Russia is employing 
psychological warfare and irregular operations across the board as means to delegitimize 
U.S. forward maritime deployments, thus positioning itself favorably to coercively deter 
conventional force posture.  
The Syrian operation (2015–2016) returned Russian power to the Middle East, 
and it provided a proving ground for Russian military and naval power. Thus, Russian 
power continues to serve as both a check-valve to American power and as a vehicle to 
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unify Eurasian states against Western interventionism. For instance, Russia is using the 
Venezuelan civil unrest as opportunity to project Russia as a global power, reestablish 
itself in Latin America, and revive the possible strategic threat as it posed from Cuba in 
the Cold War.  
Because of time and space, this report has not been able to consider in depth the 
zones of contention in the Pacific. Just as in the Baltic and Black Sea, the unresolved 
territorial issues in North Asia and its connection to the great power rivalry unfolding 
there require further attention. As in the case of Ukraine, Russian revanchism against 
Japan over the Kurile Islands and other sites of traditional Russo-Japanese conflict in 
Asia continue to serve as frozen conflicts/disputes. These conflicts allow a revanchist 
Russia both to manipulate its target of coercion and intimidation as well as to project 
itself a global power, one with which, once again, the other powers must reckon or suffer 
the consequences in an ever more brutal international system. Propaganda and bluster, 
especially about anti access and area denial in the air and maritime realms, aim to destroy 
Western confidence in the role of its naval forces in deterrence. Used to coercively deter 
opponents, these means effectively present Western states with either asymmetric 
overmatch or a negative value proposition, one in which the Russians leverage Western 
risk aversion.  
Deriving from Putin’s world-view, this aggressive policy supports whatever 
source means that the Russians will use the maritime domain in Eurasia and beyond to 
challenge U.S. naval and maritime power. This challenge will be across a spectrum of 
conflict involving the least violent and seemingly insignificant targets to the upper realms 
of major theatre war between great powers armed with the most destructive weapons 
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possible and in conflict for national survival. The core ideas in Putin’s grand strategy of 
an anti-Western ideology have a strong element of coercive statecraft and militarism. 
This dogma is highly aggressive and conflict-centric; it is buoyed by its sense of 
grievance and tit-for-tat policy that have been at its forefront since 2007. Combined with 
proliferating conflict and moving irregular military and maritime forces up and down the 
ladder of escalation, this form of nationalist policy adds an additional element of 
instability and force to statecraft that leverages surprise and depends on an ability to 
exploit indecision and weakness.  
B. FINAL THOUGHTS ON ANTI ACESS AND AREA DENIAL  
Anti access area denial is a problematic term to describe how the Russian armed 
forces think and operate because of the phenomenon of mirror imaging that has often 
afflicted how the U.S. military has reacted to strategic change for some time. This study 
underscores the need for U.S. strategists to re-acquaint themselves with the school of 
Russian strategy over a longer period of time as well as to rethink buzz word summaries 
of what appears to be path breaking innovations in weapons and military/naval 
organization. These “innovations,” when seen in the cold light of day, can often be really 
a continuation of previously existing strategies, operations, and force structure. This 
generalization is germane to this study.  
In this respect, U.S. strategists would do well, for instance, to recall that tactics 
and strategy are two different things and that the attempt to grapple with area denial and 
anti access is mired in a term that is tactical and operational. The strategic aspect of this 
term arises out of the conjuncture of renewed great power rivalry in Europe, Asia, and 
beyond, and the special characteristic of Russian strategic geography in its maritime 
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dimension. In this study, the problem faced by the U.S. Navy is a strategic one. The 
shock and awe of Russia and its maritime forces, such as they are performing multiple 
tasks at multiple levels of conflict, leads to the strategic conundrum analyzed in this 
paper. The revival of Russian ambition to be a world power, and to do so by a series of 
limited military and maritime forays in situations posing no across the board challenge to 
U.S. predominance as in former times, steadily chips away at former points of strength. 
This chipping away or Kofman’s “raids” symbolizes the long-term hope in Moscow that 
a multipolar international system will weaken the United States and enable Russia to 
return to full status of a great power. The Georgian, Crimean, and Syrian episodes speak 
to this generalization and give it a brutal validity.  
Furthermore, the long-range anti-ship missile and long-range radar features of anti 
access and area denial are more or less tactical features of how a power that is more 
continental than maritime uses the strength of the defensive to thwart the ambition of a 
maritime expeditionary power. This foiling comes in the form of air, space, and naval 
forces projected from power ashore or the use of strike aerospace power in combat at the 
tactical and operational levels. This tactical operational posture naturally has strategic 
implications with the geography that confronts a maritime power in the face of Russian 
continental power and its more or less post-2007 offensive to unravel a unipolar global 
order where the U.S. Navy in combination with its allies and partners has been the basis 
of the global reach of U.S. combat power since, at least, the end of the Cold War.  
Is the salami tactic of military and maritime reinforcement to the enclave as a step 
of aggression in the Baltic and beyond, or is this phase defensive in its strategic intent? 
Kaliningrad’s retrograde posture from being a place of European and German-Russian 
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reconciliation to a forward bastion and fortress of Putin’s Russia is a dagger to new 
NATO Europe and a united Germany now struggling to retain alliance cohesion. The 
transformation in political, strategic, and operational terms of Kaliningrad and Crimea are 
two examples of the offensive-defensive response of the Russian side to the change of the 
European security order and its decline from 1999 until the present. The hopes of the 
early 1990s that somehow the rump of East Prussia could be transformed to a bridge to 
join Russia with a united Europe seems, in the rancor of vitriol of 2019, to be more than 
odd to those who were not present in the period 1989-2007. However, this optimism was 
justified at a time when many options seemed open in European security, and the world 
was a more peaceful place prior to 11 September 2001 and Putin volte face of 2007. This 
topic is again a center of gravity for analysis. It does not comprise just an  order of battle 
in the stormy waters of the Baltic.  However, the story of the strategic choices not taken 
decades ago forms a feature in the mass persuasion battle of the present crisis. This crisis 
now is very seized of exercises, force structure, and characteristics of weapons play an 
oversized role in the perception of strategic reality versus the actual capacity of military 
force to fight and secure victory in combat and war. 
In the reading of this study, one should keep in mind that the dominant, active, 
and, indeed, hourly characteristic of great power competition is that of propaganda, 
subterfuge, and a psychological warfare campaign wielded against the center of gravity 
constituted of the will of the western democracies. In this aspect, this process has rich 
precedents in Russian history and in the epoch of total war. The period after the launch of 
Sputnik in 1957 comes to mind as a time in which the Soviets used technology and 
propaganda to diminish the then-U.S. nuclear dominance. As concerns the subject here in 
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the year 2019, the British authors Keir Giles and Mathieu Boulegue,171 following the 
example of the experts at the Swedish Defense Ministry Institute,172 have suggested that 
Russian propaganda about their weapons of defense and offense is as vital to their 
effectiveness in battle of idea and social media images as to the actual combat 
characteristics of such weapons in battle. That is to say, in an age of social media 
supplanting strategic reality as classically understood in the realms of war and strategy, 
the symbolic power of such weapons to defeat or interdict the U.S. Navy is manifest.  
The omnipresent images of the S-400 air defense rockets, as well as fleet displays 
and encounters at sea in which the U.S. Navy is made to look foolish, are but glimpses of 
this psychological operations campaign to reinforce the combat capabilities of weapons. 
Quite likely, these weapons are not as fearsome as their manufacturers or figures in the 
Russian Ministry of Defense wish one to believe. This emphasis in mass persuasion as 
the means of renewed Russian strategic defense an attack on their soil and to defense 
home waters and territory plays an outsized role in contemporary strategic reflection. 
This fact is especially the case in the Baltic and Black Sea, where NATO’s enhanced 
forward presence and tailored forward presence have meant a swift and jarring 
confrontation with the maritime strategic geography and the advantages the Russian 
defender has on the tactical and operational levels.  
With this fact of mass persuasion and its intersection with actual preparation for 
the waging of war on the intermediate and highest levels of exertion in mind, the duty 
falls on the leadership of the U.S. Navy (as well as the U.S. forces and NATO generally) 
to debunk this Russian mass persuasion while determinedly assessing how to defeat such 
                                               
171 Giles and Boulegue, “Russia’s A2/AD Capabilities,” 32.  
172 Dalsjoe, Berglund, and Jonsson, Bursting the Bubble, 77–78.  
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defenses. The Navy can uncover and unmask Russian disinformation about its weapons 
and forces through further study of the kind embodied here. Improved conceptual 
analysis in the realm of strategy versus tactics is urgent in this context, as is the need to 
enlighten a younger generation of naval strategists and planners about this facet of war at 
sea. In this regard, the duty falls on those in the U.S. Navy to portray the threat of 
freedom of maneuver and application of maritime combat power in medium to high 
intensity conflict using sound analysis and not the recycling of Russian armaments 
propaganda. The research for this study reveals that especially widely used sources in the 
United States, often authored by military affairs amateurs and those inexpert in the 
technical and conceptual themes explored here, in fact, greatly amplify the work of 
Russian propaganda and aid the strategic goal of anti access and area denial without a 
missile leaving its rocket launcher or a shell hitting a single target in the real world. 
Central to this effort are a body of persons expert in Russian military and naval affairs as 
formerly existed but who have left government service because of the march of time.  
Beyond the realm of mass persuasion and the rebuilding of defense analytical 
expertise to meet and defeat the Russian interdiction threat in all domains of conflict to 
enable deterrence and the return to political calm versus a prewar hysteria, the U.S. Navy 
should embark on an effort to make the political use of interdiction more problematic for 
the Russians. To the extent that exercises, and peaceful deployment of U.S. Navy and 
allied forces, can be made to highlight the weaknesses of Russian maritime interdiction 
and area denial, the mass persuasion of a new form of Kronstad and Sebastapol fortresses 
in the 21st century becomes more problematic. It also robs the Kremlin of its easy, 
bloodless or near bloodless, victories in Eurasia since the Georgian war of 2008. Recall 
 79 
the scene in BALTOPS in 1985,173 when the USS Iowa placidly floated in the waters of 
the Baltic pursued by a small East German patrol boat, whose crew fumed with rage at 
the enormous U.S. ship. While the situation today is surely explosive, such a show of 
maritime presence to underscore the maritime reach of the U.S. Navy is an essential 
means to break the spell of the invincible Russian maritime fortress.  
Though this issue lies outside the scope of this paper, another tactic of mass 
persuasion is the closer cooperation of those who regularly must defeat Russian 
interdiction weapons and their performance in actual combat. The strategic situation in 
Northern Europe is happily not that of a shooting war, but elsewhere nations more or less 
oriented to the West defeat Russian weapons in tactical encounters that are highly 
relevant for the themes considered here. The U.S. Navy must make greater use of this 
record to highlight the weaknesses of Russian weapons against a sophisticated and well-
equipped foe to rebut the balderdash of Russian disinformation and psychological 
warfare.  
Measures to break Russian defenses in the re-equipment and modernization of the 
maritime order of battle will be used by Russian propagandists as evidence of aggression 
and warmongering. However, in the past a generation ago, the U.S. Navy and the 
Western allies possessed such plans, force posture, and the willingness to employ theses 
forces and weapons. They should endeavor, to the extent practical, to do so again—all the 
while measuring the ways and ends at a bearable price. The result will be the return to a 
posture of deterrence that will enable policy to reassert itself in the hope that a 
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combination of sufficient armament will encourage the return to a statecraft of 





INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Research Sponsored Programs Office, Code 41 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943  
 
 
 
